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Abstract 
Since the 1980’s impaired driving behaviour has gained increased attention in the public 
sphere.  Recently, the provincial government of Ontario has passed new measures designed to 
control this behaviour.  By drawing on Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty this thesis 
focusses on how risk and uncertainty have shaped the Ontario government’s efforts to control 
impaired driving behaviour in manners that undermine the traditional “principles, standards and 
procedures” (Ericson, 2007: 30) of law.  Through a Foucaultian genealogical analysis of both 
governmental and non-governmental documents pertaining to recent impaired driving control 
efforts including; the Road Safety Act, sobriety checkpoints, and report impaired driver 
initiatives, this thesis analyzes contemporary efforts to control impaired driving behaviour in 
Ontario from 2000 to 2012. Furthermore, by drawing on work from the larger perspective of 
governmentality, this thesis recommends changes to both Ericson’s (2007) analytic and the 
governmentality perspective as a whole.  
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Introduction 
Since the 1980’s there has been a great deal of attention given to the issue of impaired 
driving
12
.  This focus transcends provincial and federal jurisdictions in Canada and has had a 
consciousness-raising effect on the general public.  The high level of concern surrounding 
impaired driving is partly due to the fact that drinking and driving is a source of uncertainty in 
society, especially as it concerns safety.  Prior to the 1980’s impaired driving was considered a 
minor, morally ambiguous offence and attitudes towards this behaviour were lax by today’s 
standards (Transport Canada, 2009).  However, we have seen this erstwhile morally ambiguous 
act morph into a serious criminal offence to which powerful social stigma has been affixed 
(Gusfield, 1981).  In spite of this, much of the dominant sociological literature that deals directly 
with the issue of impaired driving (see Gusfield, 1981; Reinarman, 1988; Jacobs, 1988; Gusfield, 
1992) predates the enactment of recent impaired driving measures.  Furthermore, within the 
governmentality perspective most articles that discuss the issue of impaired driving deal with it 
only in relation to a larger point of interest (see O’Malley, 2010; O’Malley and Valverde, 2004; 
Levi and Valverde, 2001).  In response, this thesis focusses on governing impaired driving in 
Ontario from 2000 to 2012.  This time period is chosen because of the lack of critical focus on 
impaired driving measures as a whole since the early-1990’s as well as because of the new 
impaired driving measures that have been enacted since the year 2000.   
                                                          
1
 This thesis uses the term ‘impaired driving’ instead of the more common ‘drunk driving’ as 
contemporary legislative restrictions are increasingly targeting drivers who may not be ‘drunk’ 
yet have impaired facilities.  The term ‘drunk driving’ will henceforth be reserved for victims’ 
rights movement discourse.   
2 Furthermore, the term ‘impaired driving’ is meant to signify acts of driving with a blood 
alcohol concentration which includes but is not limited to acts of consuming alcoholic beverages 
while driving.   
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To understand how contemporary impaired driving measures are meant to control the 
behaviour of drivers, this research thesis employs Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty.  
Ericson’s (2007) analytic is situated within the larger governmentality perspective due to the 
manner in which governmental power is believed to be expressed in accordance with mentalities, 
technologies and programmes of governance.  Therefore, this research is also situated within the 
larger field of governmentality by its use of Ericson’s (2007) analytic and will adopt this 
perspective’s understanding of governmental power.  To aid this study of contemporary impaired 
driving programmes, this thesis is guided by two research questions:  First, through what 
mentalities and technologies of governance is impaired driving behaviour currently governed?  
Guided by this main research question, this research also asks: how and to what extent do 
contemporary impaired driving programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) notions of precautionary 
logic, counter-law one, and counter-law two?  
Canadian jurisdictions have recently seen a wide array of governmental measures 
employed to govern impaired driving but these efforts have not been matched with serious 
academic critique. Through an examination of various governmental and non-governmental 
documents, this research examines programmes designed to manage the occurrence of impaired 
driving behaviour in Ontario, including: the Road Safety Act 2009, the increased use of sobriety 
checkpoints, and nascent report impaired driver initiatives such as Operation Lookout.  By 
applying Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty to recent governmental efforts meant to control 
impaired driving, this thesis contends that these initiatives reflect a preoccupation with risk and 
uncertainty which has structured the implementation of new governmental programmes that 
violate traditional, legal or procedural standards of law in the name of abating uncertainty. 
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Furthermore, this thesis makes several recommendations for scholars working within the 
governmentality perspective.   
Theoretical Framework 
There has been a growing tendency in recent sociological and criminological 
inquiries towards examinations of risk management (O’Malley, 2002, 2009; Beck, 1992). 
This emphasis on risk structures Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty which is here 
divided into three constitutive elements.  The first of these elements is the politics of 
uncertainty.  For Ericson (2007: 6-7), “risk is the term through which we imagine and act as 
if we know the future and can do something about it”.  However, risk as a predictive 
technology is not a unified or homogeneous construct.  It is instead a family of thought that 
involves calculations of probable futures in the face of omnipresent uncertainty (Rose, 
2001).  While some scholars have seen risk management as synonymous with actuarial 
technologies (see Feeley and Simon, 1992), this places techniques of risk assessment in 
contrast with what may be called “techniques of uncertainty” (O’Malley, 2009: 16) or 
heuristic devices such as rules of thumb or personal experiences.  This binary opposition of 
risk and uncertainty is too restrictive for an analytics of governance because actuarial risk 
technologies are often guided or supplemented by heuristic techniques such as personal 
experience and moral discourse in mixed knowledge formats. In attempting to explore how 
hybrid/mixed knowledge formats shape attempts at ordering populations, this thesis draws 
on Moore and Valverde’s (2000) use of chronotopes to examine how risk management 
initiatives are often supplemented by idiosyncratic and unscientific discourses.  
Liberal social actors are expected to mitigate uncertainty through assessments of risk.  
However, it is important to note that risk analysis can often be a self-defeating process.  As 
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Sunstein (2007) points out, we are limited by our experiences and what we can foresee as 
potential risks.  Risk analyses are prone to fail because nascent risks do not fit with available 
knowledge of risk factors and serve as poor models for future action. This ironically leads to new 
risks which ultimately stem from the management system that was designed to govern them.  
This process is what Ericson (2007: 12) refers to as “routine failures of risk management” and 
raises questions about whether or not governments can effectively control the conduct of their 
citizens.  This doubt fuels the second element of Ericson’s (2007) analytic which he termed 
precautionary logic, or the logic of the worst-case scenario.  Under precautionary logic, we are to 
expect the worst-case scenario and act against it.  Since risk management contains its limitations 
within its very reasoning, precautionary logic requires that we expect that which may be a 
statistically insignificant, but severely perilous risk.  In the final element of his analytic, Ericson 
(2007) describes how in order to ensure certainty, precautionary logic becomes the basis for 
counter-laws designed to increase certainty through the erosion of traditional standards of law 
(counter-law one) and the introduction of intrusive surveillance practices (counter-law two).    
To reduce prevalent risk factors within their jurisdictions, many western liberal 
democracies have passed an array of statutes which seem to fit Ericson’s (2007) definition of 
counter-law (see Levi, 2009; Ashworth and Zedner, 2008).  Although Ericson (2007) borrows 
the term from Foucault (1995), he divides counter-law into two types. The first, counter-law one, 
takes the form of new laws that erode or eliminate traditional legal and/or procedural safeguards 
contained within established statutes “that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of 
harm” (Ericson, 2007: 24).  Traditional legal safeguards such as rights and due process can be 
sources of uncertainty if they prevent consistent detection, apprehension and punishment of 
offences.  The judicial apparatus is one method of managing risk in society because the law often 
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sets norms or thresholds of tolerance against which wrongdoing can be evaluated (Rose and 
Valverde, 1998; see also Ericson and Doyle, 2003).  Legal mechanisms typically act on 
misconduct and limit the threat to the normative order. However, where there are perceived or 
actual impediments in the traditional mechanisms of risk management, governments become 
increasingly pressured to ensure that such obstructions are not ongoing.  While counter-law’s 
first iteration is Ericson’s (2007) own formulation, its second is much closer to Foucault’s (1995) 
original term.  
Counter-law two establishes surveillant assemblages that foster detection of adverse 
behaviour beyond the typical limits of due process (Ericson, 2007).  The surveillant assemblage 
is an open ended system of initiatives designed to direct social conduct in keeping with specific 
governmental rationalities and technologies of rule (Lippert and Wilkinson, 2010; Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000).  Furthermore, assemblages often mobilize across state and non-state institutions 
and integrate technological and non-technological aspects.  For instance, traffic cameras installed 
to monitor flows and ensure smooth transit on city streets may also be used to alert police to the 
location of criminal suspects and facilitate their apprehension (Monahan, 2010).  This transfer of 
information across departments of government characterizes the heterogeneous forms that 
counter-law two may take.  However, “in situations where it is not yet practicable to 
technologically link surveillance systems” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 610-11) surveillant 
assemblages can also use personal agency as a solution to increasing surveillance practices. For 
instance, citizens may be encouraged to call police to report suspected illegal behaviour thereby 
supplying law enforcement personnel with the reasonable grounds necessary to ensure their 
apprehension.  This surge in surveillance capacities increases the monitoring capabilities of 
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governing bodies and facilitates the management of the population towards the convenient end of 
governmentality.  
In determining whether contemporary impaired driving programmes represent forms of 
counter-law two, this thesis employs Ericson’s (2007) version of counter-law rather than 
Foucault’s.  However, Ericson’s (2007) iteration requires refinement before it can be employed 
in a modern governmentality analysis.  While staying true to the basic principles of Foucaultian 
(1995) counter-law, Ericson’s (2007) use of the concept in his analytic differs slightly and this 
requires attention. Counter-law two builds on Ericson’s previous work regarding the surveillant 
assemblage (see Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) and extends it to an analytics of government. 
Counter-law two examines the increasing development and interconnectedness of surveillant 
assemblages designed to monitor populations beyond the traditional legal limits imposed on 
surveillance practices and ensure that those monitored “will internalize the gaze” (Ericson, 2007: 
29) and self-police.  The concept of the surveillant assemblage attempts to move beyond the 
popular contemporary metaphors of Orwellian and panoptic monitoring by stressing horizontal 
over hierarchical developments in modern surveillance. Others have put forth similar ideas 
drawing on Bauman’s notions of liquid modernity (see Lyon, 2010) or Deleuze’s notion of 
control societies (see Walters, 2006).  In a similar vein, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) draw on the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987).  Surveillant assemblages differ from the traditional 
panoptic and Orwellian notions of totalizing surveillance due to how they function as a 
multiplicity with the potential to work together as a functional entity.  In an effort to advance 
contemporary understandings of surveillance, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) attempt to move 
beyond the contemporary Foucaultian metaphor of the ‘gaze’ and its inherently disciplinary 
function (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).  In a society where disciplinary governmental tendencies 
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are increasingly displaced, populations are broken down into discrete flows that are mobilized 
horizontally, rather than in a top-down manner.  For Haggerty and Ericson (2000), contemporary 
surveillance is increasingly characterized by the interconnectedness of diverse surveillance 
infrastructures and as such the panoptic metaphor which characterizes 18
th
 century prisons, 
schools, and workhouses is insufficient.   
However, while the surveillant assemblage was developed to create a more effective 
intellectual tool for understanding surveillance practices (see Haggerty, 2006), its inclusion as a 
constitutive element of counter-law two may actually negate this effect.  The understanding that 
various institutions cooperate for the purposes of observation may not lead to the development of 
better analytical research tools but instead may actually muddle important distinctions between 
governmentalities.  For example, as an element of counter-law two surveillant assemblages are 
constituted by governmental efforts that seek to “striate the space over” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 385) which they reign by “introducing breaks and divisions into otherwise free-flowing 
phenomena” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 608) to ensure the effective disciplining of 
populations under observation (Ericson, 2007).  At these artificial junctions, information is 
collected about populations to compare their behaviour to normative standards and more 
effectively govern their conduct.  Problematically, counter-law two’s introduction of breaks into 
flows to ensure normative self-governance appears to adhere to a disciplinary governmentality 
while Ericson’s (2007) analytic is driven by neoliberal governmental logic obsessed with 
uncertainty and securitization (Deukmedjian, 2013). Before determining whether contemporary 
governmental efforts to control impaired driving behaviour reflect Ericson’s (2007) notion of 
counter-law two, a distinction must be made between disciplinary and securitizing surveillance 
lest these become conflated.  
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To determine through which mentalities and technologies impaired driving is governed as 
well as how and to what extent drinking driving programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic it 
is necessary to discuss how governmental power is expressed and elaborate these key concepts.  
This research examines new legal statutes and extrajudicial initiatives programmes of 
governance.  Under Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty, counter-laws are used as 
programmes designed to promote certainty.  In doing so, the healthy functioning of competitive 
enterprise is aided in fulfillment of the governmental ends emblematic of neoliberal mentalities 
of governance (Foucault, 2007).  Programmes such as counter-law create “a practicable object 
for corrective intervention” (Donzelot, 1979: 77) and governmental redirection.  This is done in 
line with the mentalities or strategies of government that structures how we see reality and 
objects of governance.  Closely related to the strategies of governance are various technologies 
of governance that allow for programmes to be established.  With the ascendency of  neoliberal 
governmentality the individual (in opposition to the social (see Rose, 1996)) becomes the 
primary object of governmental intervention and technologies of risk and insurance are 
employed to structure programmes designed to facilitate the entrepreneurial enterprise of free 
subjects consistent with this governmentality.  In contradistinction to the grand sociological 
focus of Beck (1992), Ericson (2007) views risk analysis as a technology of governance that 
works in tandem with the governmental logic of neoliberalism to activate and manage 
communities (Rose, 1996) on the basis of their risk. Under a neoliberal mentality, contemporary 
governance largely abandons the social as the primary locus of governmental programmes.  It is 
seen instead as a potential source of energy comprised of the enterprising free will of individuals 
“who are to be active in their own government” (Rose, 1996: 330).  Risk has become an 
increasingly important governmental technology as individuals are to choose how best to 
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maximize their potential and govern themselves “at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 9) from 
the state.  Where risk factors threaten individual enterprise, governments must take action to 
reduce fear and unpredictability.  By adopting this understanding of governmental power and 
acknowledging the central importance of risk in contemporary society, this thesis examines 
through what mentalities and technologies impaired driving behaviour is currently governed.  By 
examining these aspects of governmental power, this thesis also examines how and to what 
extent contemporary impaired driving programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) notions of 
precautionary logic, counter-law one, and counter-law two.  
Literature Review 
While the issue of impaired driving has achieved significant cultural capital in recent 
years, the current literature has neglected coherent analyses of impaired driving in favour of 
producing work analyzing the efficacy of contemporary governmental policy (see Sen, 2001; 
Voas, 1997; Beck and Moser, 2006).  From the perspective of governmentality, this type of work 
has the unfortunate tendency of neglecting the impetus behind the move to criminalize impaired 
driving as well as the incentive fueling contemporary governmental policy.  Programmes 
designed to govern impaired driving emerge at specific time periods due to the unique interaction 
of prevalent discourses. As various discourses gain ascendancy or fade into obscurity new 
programmes develop using new discursive reasoning.  In spite of this, much of the current 
scholarship fails to ask how such measures have been implemented or why they are altered.  
While much of the present scholarly work concerning impaired driving neglects coherent 
theoretical engagement, during the 1980’s there was a large body of scholarship devoted to 
constructionist analyses of the anti-impaired driving movement and its use of social capital in 
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having its initiatives legislated (see Reinarman, 1988; Jacobs, 1988; Gusfield, 1981).  However, 
this body of scholarship largely faded from view by the mid 1990’s.     
Where constructionist sociological analyses often examine the manifestations of social 
problems such as impaired driving, studies within the governmentality perspective tend to focus 
on the regulation of these problems through their governance (Lippert and Stenson, 2010).  In 
their efforts to govern the occurrence of impaired driving on roadways many liberal democracies 
have passed increasingly harsh penalties since the 1980’s which have included “mandatory jail 
sentences for first offenders convicted of [driving under the influence]” (Reinarman, 1988: 100).  
To justify these harsh penalties, contemporary policies rely heavily on the cultural trope of the 
“killer drunk” (Gusfield, 1981: 173).  The killer-drunk represents those who willfully drive while 
impaired and cause a collision in which the innocent (sober) person(s) is killed while the driver 
emerges unscathed.  Their pursuit of pleasure outweighs the potential negative consequences of 
their actions and as such they represent a social actor unable to be deterred without austere 
disciplinary intervention (Houston and Richardson, 2004).  By existing solely to ensure the 
manifestation of their own hedonistic desires, the killer drunk counters the characteristics 
deemed necessary for enterprising subjects and thereby “poses a threat to us all” (Houston and 
Richardson, 2004: 53).  The risk calculating behaviour that is required of all neoliberal citizens is 
absent from the mind of the killer drunk and as such they represent an anomaly in a period 
characterized by autonomous self-governance (Rose, 1996).  This cultural trope became widely 
disseminated in the late 1970’s and the image of all impaired drivers as representations of this 
malevolent social actor became embedded in governmental programmes (Gusfield, 1981).  As a 
result, since the 1980’s there are few impaired driving programmes that do not focus on the 
worst-case scenario of mortality and calamity as a result of driving after drinking.  While the 
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killer drunk has attained widespread cultural dominance, it has not received much attention in 
sociological studies and practically none within the governmentality perspective.   
There is a clear void in the governmentality literature as it pertains to the issue of 
impaired driving.  Although drinking and driving has been a popular subject in modern 
legislatures it cannot be said to have received the same degree of interest from governmentality 
scholars.   Whereas previous work, such as O’Malley and Valverde (2004), and Levi and 
Valverde (2001), has examined the governmental discourses of pleasure and the use of legal 
knowledge surrounding alcohol use and/or impaired driving, there remains a need for work that 
critically analyzes the measures taken to govern impaired driving and the mentalities of 
governance behind them.  The focus of these articles is often the use of police science or the 
problematization of professional discourse instead of a critical analysis of contemporary 
programmes of governance and the rationalities and technologies that structure their 
implementation. 
This thesis therefore fills a void in the governmentality literature by examining through 
what mentalities and technologies impaired driving behaviour is currently governed as well as 
how and to what extent contemporary impaired driving programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) 
analytic of uncertainty.  Much of the current literature being distributed by Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) repeatedly states that impaired driving is “the most tolerated, frequently 
committed violent crime in America” (Mejeur, 2007: 16). The dominant focus on the threat to 
the social good by the malevolent killer drunk in political discourse necessitates increased 
attention to how notions of risk and uncertainty influence the perceived necessity of recent 
impaired driving measures.  By exploring how and to what extent contemporary impaired driving 
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programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty, this thesis represents a novel study 
in the governmentality literature.   
Methodology and Data Sources 
To understand through which mentalities and technologies impaired driving is currently 
being governed as well as how and to what extent impaired driving programmes reflect Ericson’s 
(2007) analytic, multiple data sources covering a diverse array of governmental and non-
governmental documents have been employed. Using a governmentality perspective makes it 
insufficient to rely solely on governmental or state sources. The judicial apparatus relies heavily 
on “knowledge and expertise that [is] non-legal” (Rose and Valverde, 1998: 543) and thus 
employing only governmental documents is unsatisfactory.  Therefore, governmental and non-
governmental textual sources have been studied to respond to the research question.  It is 
especially important to look at how the problem of impaired driving is given its form via non-
governmental bodies under neoliberalism while also looking at the various programmes 
implemented in line with this governmentality. In keeping with the Foucaultian nature of 
governmentality, this research used a genealogical approach (see Foucault, 2010) to interpret the 
data sources employed.   
To ensure a comprehensive analysis of the governmental documents, this research used 
the following seven data sources: ten years of MADD Canada’s Annual Reports, a government 
brochure entitled, Smashed: A Sober Look at Drinking and Driving, Hansard documents 
regarding the Road Safety Act 2009, twenty-five articles from The Globe and Mail covering the 
police use of sobriety checkpoints, a Traffic Injury Research Foundation study detailing the use 
of sobriety checkpoints as well as a public awareness brochure, and finally a procedures manual 
pertaining to the Operation Lookout Call 9-1-1 campaign.   
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As its first main source of data this thesis used ten years of Annual Reports published by 
MADD Canada spanning from 2001-2002 to 2010-2011.  These reports summarized MADD 
Canada’s view on the issue of impaired driving and contain statistics used by legislators.  These 
reports also dictated the persistent nature of the problem of impaired driving and make 
recommendations for new policies to be enacted.  Second, in addition to MADD Canada’s 
Annual Reports, this thesis also examined a Canadian government brochure titled, Smashed: A 
Sober Look at Drinking and Driving.  Smashed is a public awareness brochure found by 
accessing the federal government’s website and using the search term ‘impaired driving’.  This 
document detailed the continuous hazard that impaired drivers are believed to pose to the safety 
of Canadian roadways.  Furthermore, it documented recent impaired driving programmes and 
explains how motorists are apprehended.  This brochure was chosen over others because it was 
published by the Canadian government as well as because it used information published by 
MADD Canada thereby granting it cultural esteem as well as pairing it nicely with the MADD 
Canada’s Annual Reports.  To determine how and to what extent contemporary impaired driving 
programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic, it was important examine the manner that these 
documents, which have influence over the implementation of programmes, expose a growing 
preoccupation with risk and uncertainty.       
It is important to examine the role that discourses present in public awareness documents 
play in shaping actual governmental programmes to govern impaired driving.  As the third data 
source, this research used Hansard texts that described the enactment of the Road Safety Act 
2009.  Hansard documents are an excellent data source because of their easy accessibility and 
thorough examination of the measures proposed.  Furthermore, Hansard texts detail the 
rationality used to support the implementation of a proposed programme.  The Hansard 
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documents from the first, second, third and outside committee readings were examined to 
determine how and to what extent this programme reflects Ericson’s (2007) analytic of 
uncertainty.   
The final data sources that were employed in this research thesis pertain to the 
establishment of new surveillance measures that may be deemed emblematic of the second form 
of counter-law in Ericson’s (2007) analytic.  In seeking to determine whether or not counter-
law’s second iteration was present in government initiatives, this thesis analyzed various official 
and unofficial documents pertaining to the use of sobriety checkpoints as well as the nascent 
‘Call 9-1-1’ programs. Each of these endeavours is elaborated in turn.  These surveillance 
apparatuses represent two distinct approaches to combatting impaired driving and require 
independent analyses.     
Sobriety checkpoints are hardly novel approaches to governing impaired driving as they 
have been operating in Canada since the 1970’s.  However, in jurisdictions such as Ontario 
sobriety checkpoints have expanded in recent years and operate year round as opposed to 
functioning mostly as intensive holiday season initiatives (Government of Ontario, 2012).  To 
ascertain the increased operation of sobriety checkpoints in Ontario since the year 2000 in 
relation to the second form of counter-law in Ericson’s (2007) analytic and due to the lack of 
official government documentation, the fourth source of data this thesis employed was print 
media articles pertaining to sobriety checkpoints in Ontario.  Twenty-five articles printed in The 
Globe and Mail from 1979 to 2007 were used to detail how sobriety checkpoints were employed 
in Ontario as well as to provide a view of the perceived necessity of such a programme.  Since 
The Globe and Mail is the newspaper ‘of record’ in Canada as well as one of the nation’s most 
widely read publications it is highly likely that these articles have been read by a sizeable 
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proportion of the population and accurately reflect the dominant discourse as it pertains to 
impaired driving. 
 In addition to print media, the fifth and sixth sources of data this research analyzed were 
both published by the Traffic Injury Research Foundation (TIRF) and pertain to the use of 
sobriety checkpoints.  To determine how these programmes were used in accordance with 
governmental rationalities and technologies it was vital to analyze the research carried out by 
TIRF as they are a non-governmental agency which is directly employed by the federal 
government in order to determine the efficacy of proposed programmes.  The literature published 
by TIRF detailed the history of sobriety checkpoints and offered a national and international 
perspective on this programme.  The first document by TIRF this research analyzed was a public 
awareness pamphlet that examined the benefits of employing sobriety checkpoints. This was 
designed to garner public support for the programme.  The second of TIRF’s publications that 
this research examined was an annual progress report (2005-2006) from Transport Canada’s 
Strategy to Reduce Impaired Driving (STRID) 2010.  STRID 2010 is a five year plan designed to 
reduce the amount of fatalities per annum believed to be associated with alcohol impaired 
driving.  This report provided extensive documentation of the use of sobriety checkpoint across 
Canada.  In addition to this holistic focus, as an officially commissioned report, the findings had 
a direct effect on the operation of sobriety checkpoints and reflected the dominant discourse 
surrounding their use.     
In recent years, there has been a wide array of surveillance measures designed to govern 
this behaviour.  In addition to sobriety checkpoints, report impaired driver programmes reflect a 
unique and nascent approach to governing impaired driving.  Using the infrastructure of the 9-1-
1 emergency hotlines, motorists who suspect someone is driving while impaired are able to alert 
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the police and provide the reasonable grounds needed by police to stop and assess a motorist’s 
sobriety.  While there are several programmes in operation throughout Canada, their novelty has 
resulted in very little attention in the academic literature.  The seventh and final data source this 
thesis examined was an instruction manual published by the Ontario Community Council on 
Impaired Driving (OCCID).  OCCID started an initiative called Operation Lookout that was 
designed to encourage communities to watch for impaired drivers and notify the police of 
suspected motorists.  This instruction manual documented the steps needed to implement 
Operation Lookout in various communities and made suggestions for how best to ensure 
impaired drivers are kept off the road.  As it provided detailed information regarding the use of 
this ‘Call 9-1-1’ programme this manual was a valuable data source for determining through 
which rationalities and technologies impaired driving is currently being governed as well as how 
and to what extent contemporary impaired driving programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic 
of uncertainty.   
  To best answer the research question, this thesis adopted a Foucaultian genealogical 
approach to data analysis.  For Foucault (2003), there are “always-already” (Hunt and Wickham, 
1994: 89) multiple conceptions of various public issues with these varying discourses being 
activated at specific times due to their elective affinity with contemporary mentalities of rule. To 
determine through which mentalities and technologies impaired driving is currently being 
governed as well as how and to what extent contemporary governance of impaired driving 
reflects Ericson’s (2007) analytic, this research analyzes the aforementioned texts to determine if 
the representation of impaired driving and the necessity of the programmes enacted to govern the 
behaviour reflect a preoccupation with uncertainty and risk.  Genealogy represents a distinctive 
approach to the study of social issues.  Attempts at governance including the recent focus on 
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impaired driving are historically contingent and fabricated from temporal interconnections.  The 
aim of the genealogist is not to show that the historical progression of events leads inexorably to 
the present but instead to display how there are multiple and sometimes inconsistent knowledge 
discourses imbued within efforts to know and govern social issues (Foucault, 2010).  There is no 
unity, teleology or destiny linking the historical progression of events; rather, social events are 
assemblages of multiple heterogeneous factors pieced together at specific points in history due to 
the interconnecting of knowledge and power discourses (Scheurich and McKenzie, 2007).  Using 
a Foucaultian genealogical approach as a research method requires a strict rejection of traditional 
philosophical understandings of historical events.  As there are always multiple conceptions of 
social issues which simultaneously structure efforts of governance, the genealogist takes as their 
mission the task of untangling this complex array of critical and effective histories (Dean, 1994) 
to see how they interconnect and structure attempts at governance in unique and historically 
contingent manners.  The various types of discourses used in the governance of a problem are 
reflected in documents describing strategies of regulation (Rose and Valverde, 1998).  Therefore, 
this study of governing impaired driving is an effort to determine how programmes of 
governance are implemented in accordance with specific mentalities and technologies of 
governance.  Simply, how and to what extent do contemporary impaired driving programmes 
reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty?  By using a Foucaultian genealogical approach 
this research thesis examines through which mentalities and technologies impaired driving is 
being governed and how and to what extent programmes implemented in the contemporary 
period reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty.   
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Analysis 
Risk and Uncertainty in Social Liberal Governmentality 
How a problem is governed, by whom, and who is targeted for governance, are questions 
vital to a governmentality analysis (Dean, 2010).   Attempts to govern a problem shape how it 
becomes “known” and therefore controlled (see Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 89).  Since the mass 
production of the automobile in the early 20
th
 century, attempts at governing driving behaviour 
have “produced at least two new governable subjects” (Simon, 1997: 523) that had not existed 
previously; most notably, the driver and the pedestrian.  How best to govern these subjects is 
fundamentally a question linked to governmentalities. It calls upon specific knowledge 
discourses that rely on various mentalities of rule.  Each contains a “characteristically moral 
form” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 178) and is “articulated in a distinctive idiom” (Rose and Miller, 
1992: 179) that structures the perception of social issues in multiple, idiosyncratic ways.  This 
can be seen quite clearly within initial efforts at controlling driving behaviour on a macro level in 
the United States.  Simon (1997) examines the first large scale effort on the part of a North 
American government to adopt national standards about how to control automobile accidents.  
The 1932 Report of the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, or the 
Columbia Plan as it is popularly known, was a governmental response to the growing problem of 
the automobile accident.  It proposed mandated third party insurance for all drivers, complete 
abolition of fault for drivers involved in accidents, standardization of benefits, and administrative 
justice by an oversight board which would respond to the resolution of claims (Simon, 1997: 
571).  While it was not implemented into law, the Columbia Plan represents an effort at 
controlling automotive behaviour through distinctive strategies and technologies of governance 
that differ from contemporary efforts as in the case of impaired driving.  
19 
 
 The Columbia Plan marks an approach to governing quite alien in the current neoliberal 
era.  As a social liberal
3
 governmentality began to take shape in the 1930’s4, risk in civil society 
became increasingly analyzed as part of a social issue to be aggregated and dealt with at the level 
of the population (O’Malley, 2002).  Social liberal governmentality represents a political 
mentality that fosters the development of national growth and prosperity through the “promotion 
of social responsibility and the mutuality of social risk” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 24).  This 
represents a distinct approach to governing social issues.  What characterizes social liberal 
governance is the manner in which bio-political governmental technologies fuse with the 
mentality of social liberal governmentality. As Foucault (2003b: 242) conceived it, biopolitics is 
a technology of power which seeks to rule “man-as-species being”.  As a governmental 
technology, it is fundamentally concerned with rates among populations.  Groups establish rates 
in birth, mortality, health, and education solely due to the fact that there are assemblies of people 
living in close proximity.  Rates are established prior to any attempt at governmental control. 
Biopolitics is a form of power that seeks to govern the population through discovery of these 
rates in an attempt to maintain homeostasis.  Issues that plague the population must be acted 
upon to ensure the continuing security of the populace.  Fundamentally, biopolitics seeks to 
maintain the “biosphere” within which human population dwell (Dean, 2001: 47).  By improving 
living conditions and fostering life while reducing death, the biosphere is maintained and the 
security of the population and future generations is ensured.  Under social liberal mentalities of 
rule, biopolitical technologies were mixed with a mentality of governance that stressed 
                                                          
3
  As stated by Lippert (2005: 5), social liberalism is also referred to in the governmentality 
literature as “liberal welfarism” or less often as welfare liberalism.   
4
 This is perhaps best exemplified by the wave of measures instituted by the United States 
Federal Government collectively titled the “New Deal” that effectively marked the introduction 
of Keynesian welfare-state politics in the United States.   
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governing populations around the norm (see Rose, 1996).  Risks that affect the security of the 
population are to be brought under control lest the legitimacy of the state to maintain the security 
of its population be called into question.   
  The interpretation of risk as a collective issue to be mitigated at the level of the 
population is exemplified by the Columbia Plan of 1932.  The Plan is important because of its 
attempt to implement the first systematic effort at governing driving behaviour on a national 
scale. Of its four key elements, the most important was the recommendation for “the complete 
abolition of fault” (Simon, 1997: 571) on the part of individual drivers.  Instead of viewing the 
negative consequences of driving as aberrations to be corrected by driver’s adopting error-free 
behaviour (Featherstone, 2004), the Columbia Plan viewed the deaths and injuries associated 
with automotive transportation as an inherent by-product of this form of transportation.  This 
idea is perhaps best illustrated by the ethical proposition allegedly put to students of American 
philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen:  
Suppose an angel came down from heaven and promised the people of the United States 
a marvelous invention.  It would simplify their lives; enable the injured to receive quick 
treatment; decrease the time of transportation by a large magnitude; bring families and 
friends closer together and create a life of far greater ease and convenience than exists 
today.  However, in return for this grateful boon to human welfare, the angel demanded 
that every year 5,000 Americans be put to death on the steps of the Capitol.  Having 
posed the question, the philosopher then asked the class what answer should be given to 
the angel.  After the ethical dilemma had been discussed for some time, the professor 
pointed out that every year many more than 5,000 were killed in automobile accidents in 
the United States (Gusfield, 1981: 3). 
 
Like Cohen, the Columbia Plan stipulates that instead of automobile accidents being a problem 
that arises solely from a lack of individual attentiveness or outright carelessness; calamities 
resulting from the widespread use of the automobile are inevitable. Individual fault cannot be 
applied in instances of traffic accidents since they are a fundamental element of automotive 
transportation.  As seen in the case of automobiles, social liberal governance fosters inclusive 
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governmental approaches to risk.  Instead of focussing primarily on the risky individual and 
targeting them for intervention, social liberal governmentality acts on all individuals through its 
focus on the aggregate rates that populations establish.  This emphasis on risk as a constitutive 
feature of the population represents a unique focus on risk management that differs from the 
current neoliberal governmentalities.   
Neoliberal Risk Management 
Where risk under social liberal mentalities of governance saw a pooling of risks and 
inclusive normative governance, neoliberal mentalities see a handing back of risk from 
collectives to the individual.  In his chapter on social security, Ericson (2007: 80) describes how 
the shifting of risk to the individual is underpinned by the threat of a collective “moral hazard” 
wherein social benefits are seen to be providing too much security and rendering individuals 
complacent.  Under neoliberalism, risk becomes less a danger to the population in need of 
pooling and more suggestive of an individual threat which is to be mitigated by single 
entrepreneurial actors.  In Foucault’s (2008) view, neoliberal policies differ markedly from those 
of earlier social liberalism.  Programmes such as social security, redistribution, and revenue 
equalization become viewed as the epitome of unsound governmental policies.  As the neoliberal 
state is believed to govern for the market (rather than through it), policies that do not actively 
foster individual entrepreneurship, competition, and “the multiplicity and differentiation of 
enterprises” (Foucault, 2008: 149) are to be avoided.  The individual is believed to be not only 
capable of being responsible and enterprising but actively expected to do so.  Whereas social 
liberal governmental efforts view the individual more as a passive actor which “largely 
subordinated free will” (O’Malley, 2002: 24), the neoliberal citizen is to be an active and 
enterprising subject.    
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 By acknowledging risk is a governmental technology that is not a unified or 
homogeneous concept, attention is directed to how risk may be deployed in heterogeneous and 
conflicting ways. To un-pack the present assemblage of governmental discourses which structure 
the current effort to control impaired driving behaviours several of these ways will be explored.  
However, and in contradiction to Ericson’s (2007) analytic, risk management initiatives are not 
the sole technology of governance involved in the control of impaired driving behaviour.  Moral 
discourses emblematic of neoconservative mentalities of governance are also employed to 
structure attempts at governance.  It is perhaps better to view contemporary technologies of 
governance in terms of their elective affinity to neoliberal or neoconservative political 
mentalities rather than ascribing risk management initiatives to one or the other (O’Malley, 
2002). Governmental technologies which order the population in line with neoliberal mentalities 
see populations in terms of their riskiness, while technologies that order populations in line with 
neoconservative mentalities employ moral discourses that work alongside neoliberal 
technologies of risk. Each of these is elaborated in turn.   
Actuarial Logic of Risk Management 
Although actuarial logic gained prominence in the 1992 article The New Penology, 
contemporary understandings of actuarial risk management have expanded significantly 
beyond what Feeley and Simon (1992) initially described as a “pre-political logic” stressing 
incapacitation (O’Malley, 2009: 327).  Current actuarial efforts designed to control risk in 
modern society have abandoned the foci that were so prolific under social liberal 
governmentalities with respect to their attention towards the risky deviant.  For example, 
Becker’s (1991) seminal book Outsiders exemplifies the contrast between social liberal 
governmental risk management with more recent actuarial efforts.  Becker’s (1991) primary 
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effort is to illuminate the social processes that have led to the marginalization of certain 
groups of “deviant people” based on historical discourses of morality and political economic 
opportunism.  By focussing on marijuana users, Becker (1991) stresses that there existed 
specific constructions of drug taking that designed efforts at criminalization and control of 
these deviant populations.  Actuarial logic differentiates itself from earlier work such as 
Becker (1991) by operating not around moral and political constructions of deviance but 
rather around calculations of risk among populations.  Actuarial logic of risk management 
downplays the ‘problem individuals’ or social deviants that pervaded governmental efforts 
under social liberalism and instead focusses more on problematic situations.    
Within the field of criminology, the actuarial logic of risk assessment is believed to 
be constitutive of scientific calculations of probability which are applied to populations.  
Actuarial logic does not grant moral-political weighting to wrongdoers but instead orders 
groups “based on the risk represented by an offender” (O’Malley, 2004: 326).  Within an 
actuarial logic of risk management victims and offender are engaged in a symbiotic zero-
sum gain relationship.  The legal safeguards imbedded in the prosecution and punishment of 
potential offenders are believed to manifest themselves as a loss of potential justice for 
victims.   
 An actuarial logic of risk management is present in the contemporary victims’ rights 
discourse as they attempt to realize their desires for new measures designed to reduce 
instances of impaired driving behaviour.  First of all, actuarial risk management is 
manifested by the use of aggregate quantitative statistics designed to foster awareness of the 
issue that needs to be controlled and gain perspective on the problem. In their annual reports 
to the public, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) Canada repeatedly states the number 
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of impaired driving trips taken by individuals in Canada is approximately 12.5 million 
(MADD Canada, 2011: 7).  Furthermore, MADD Canada states that every year 1,200 people 
are killed by impaired driving, 68,000 are injured, and the societal cost borne as a result of 
impaired drivers is 21 billion dollars (MADD Canada, 2011: 6).  The use of aggregated 
descriptive statistics is designed to gauge the scope of the problem and target a group of 
people as the focus of governmental intervention in behaviours such as driving.  Impaired 
drivers are believed to present a significant threat to the general population and must be 
targeted for removal lest the continued risk they pose to victims remain present.   
 In what is perhaps its most intriguing trait, victims’ rights discourse contains two 
separate logics pertaining to the actuarial risks associated with impaired driving behaviours.  
One seeks to manage what could be termed “responsible (although not sober) driving” and 
the other seeks to eliminate “drunk driving” or the high risk instances of this same 
behaviour.   In keeping with the actuarial logic of risk assessment, “drunk” driving is 
believed to represent an action that immediately poses a threat to (potential) victims.  
Therefore, new laws are necessary to ensure that people who drive “drunk” are unable to 
perpetuate the harmful consequences of impaired driving.   While seeking to eliminate harm 
from “drunk” driving, MADD Canada does not attempt to eliminate what it deems 
responsible drinking among adults aged 21 and older (Toomey, 2005).  According to Feeley 
and Simon (1992: 455), what differentiates an actuarial logic from other approaches to risk is 
the inherent focus on “identifying and managing unruly groups”, rather than the total 
elimination of potential risks.  The victims’ rights movement does not advocate for the 
complete sobriety of all drivers.  Those who are responsible in their drinking are not targeted 
for intervention.  It is a common misconception that MADD Canada is a neo-prohibitionist 
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organization seeking zero tolerance provisions on North American roads for all drivers (see 
Toomey, 2005).  However, by stressing the management of the risky individual over the 
larger structural issues of alcohol availability and auto manufacturing/design, MADD 
Canada has been able to secure both financial and broadcasting support from large 
corporations that have ensured the prominence of their movement over others (Marshall and 
Oleson, 1994).  The victims’ rights movement (led by MADD Canada) promotes the 
management of impaired driving by differentiating between types of this behaviour based on 
probable risk to the population. 
Where impaired driving is believed to pose a significant threat to the safety of the 
population, a zero sum game is imagined in which the risky behaviour engaged in by 
impaired drivers is believed to directly “represent risk to (potential) victims” (O’Malley, 
2004: 334).   As MADD Canada’s 2010 Annual Report argues, “the excuses [for ‘drunk’ 
driving] are myriad, ‘I’ve only had a few’, ‘I feel fine to drive’, ‘I’m only going down the 
street’. ‘The outcomes are tragic’ (3)”.  Clearly, “drunk” driving is not an act conceived as 
ending in a situation where both the driver and the victims exist in equilibrium.  Any 
“drunken” driving event that does not result in arrest is categorized as an affront to impaired 
driving victims, even if no people were actually victimized.  As stated by Constable Eric 
Booth in MADD Canada’s 2003 Annual Report, “[drunk] drivers make victims’ of us all… 
In my opinion, one [drunk] driver on our roads is one [drunk] driver too many (pp. 1, 11)”.  
Even an act as simple as driving down the street while ‘drunk’ is believed to present a 
serious risk to the health and safety of others.  By invoking descriptive statistics to shape the 
perception of the impaired driving issue and by seeking to sort and classify drinking and 
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driving based on risk, actuarial logic of risk management is present in the current 
governmental efforts to control impaired driving.  
However, there is another element to actuarial logic that goes beyond simply classifying 
groups based on their respective risk factors.  According to Hannah-Moffat (1999: 79) “actuarial 
governing does not necessarily leave individuals free” to act and then be governed according to 
their defined risk level.  Instead, actuarial logic also pushes responsibility back onto the 
individual to actively monitor their behaviours and govern themselves according to these risk 
categories (O’Malley, 1992).  This autonomous self-governance imposed under neoliberal 
governmentalities is a response to the omnipresent risk and uncertainty in contemporary liberal 
democracies.  The Canadian government brochure, Smashed: A Sober Look at Drinking and 
Driving, reflects this preoccupation with risk awareness on the part of the individual as 
neoliberal citizens.  Drivers are required to consider their behaviour and avoid the risk of 
impaired driving because “in the end, the decision to drink and drive or not is a personal 
decision” (Transport Canada, 2009: 5).  Drivers should exercise their transportation options and 
do one of the following: “pick a designated driver (and offer to return the favour next time).  Call 
a cab. Take the bus” (Transport Canada, 2009: 21).   The preoccupation with individual 
responsibility as the locus of governmental efforts reflects a neoliberal mentality of governance.   
The focus on individual risk avoidance as a logic of governance constructs questions of 
how to govern impaired driving in a way that neglects how this behaviour is influenced by socio-
cultural conditions.  In their 1981 ethnographic study of bar culture, Gusfield, Kotarba, and 
Rasmussen (1996) found that among regular drinkers, being able to “take care of themselves” 
(Gusfield et al., 1996: 123) is the hallmark of a competent drinker.  Instead of drinking and 
driving being abnormal, bar culture facilitates the development of a social system in which not 
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drinking and driving is the aberrant act.  As their ethnography was conducted in San Diego, a 
city noted for its large geographic size, the necessity of driving after drinking is further 
exacerbated by the often long distances necessary for drivers to travel home and the lack of mass 
transportation available in the late evening (Gusfield et al., 1996). The conceptualization of 
impaired driving as an individual risk to be mitigated is predicated on both specific behavioural 
norms as well as the existence of alternative transportation options.  These options are 
increasingly absent as one exits urban areas as too often impaired driving “laws are made [only] 
for people in the city” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008: 4537).    
In spite of efforts undertaken to convince individuals not to drink and drive, impaired driving 
is believed to be a problem which “despite stronger federal and provincial impaired driving 
legislation, frequent sobriety checkpoints and awareness campaigns … continues to be a 
significant issue” (MADD Canada, 2009: 5).   At this juncture we can observe a schism between 
risk mitigation as understood by neo as opposed to social liberalism.  Whereas under social 
liberalism risks were to be aggregated, risk in the neoliberal state is to be a source of creative 
enterprise as it allows for people to gauge the likelihood of future events.  The solution to the 
problem of negative risk within a neoliberal mentality of governance is to make people more 
aware of the risks they take and act to mitigate them.  As O’Malley (2002: 26) states, under 
actuarial risk management “individuals are expected as far as possible to avoid such negative 
risks as crime, ill-health or unemployment … but they must do so actively and on their own 
behalf”.  This current manifestation of actuarial risk as a governmental technology is reflected in 
contemporary drinking and driving discourse.  The necessity of raising awareness among the 
population is a central goal of victims’ rights discourse and structures state sponsored efforts at 
control.  For instance, the Strategy to Reduce Impaired Driving (STRID) 2010 report states, as 
28 
 
per their recommendations, that many jurisdictions had implemented the recommended 
initiatives that seek to: 
Implement and maintain awareness programs in schools form an early stage (i.e. 
kindergarten through Grade 12) with appropriately targeted messaging.                      
Highlight the costs associated with drinking and driving.                                      
Target/personalize educational campaigns for different audiences (STRID 2008: 5). 
 
By highlighting the costs of impaired driving and aiming to raise awareness and educate 
there is an implicit assumption that these individuals are capable of being deterred and a 
simultaneous marginalization of structural level factors.  Clearly, part of the official strategy 
to reducing impaired driving is molding citizens into better risk managers through increased 
awareness campaigns.  By raising awareness, neoliberal citizens will incorporate new 
information about risk in their effort to govern themselves at a distance from the state in 
accordance with an actuarial logic of risk management.   
Mixed Governmental Logics: Neoconservative and Neoliberal Governmentality 
While the neoliberal logic of actuarial justice is present within victims’ rights 
discourse, actuarial logic assumes the offender is morally neutral and inert (O’Malley, 2004).  
The will to commit harm is not a necessary characteristic of their behaviour to warrant 
punishment.  However, this morally neutral view of impaired driving behaviour does not 
encapsulate all attempts at governing drinking and driving.  Moral discourses also structure 
attempts at controlling impaired driving behaviours in manners that differ from the risk 
management orientations of both social and neoliberalism.  Neoconservative mentalities 
interact with neoliberal ones in an attempt to govern the present and control impaired driving 
behaviour.  However, neoconservative mentalities draw upon traditional conservative beliefs 
and therefore require elucidation.  Conservative mentalities stress that “the ultimate test of a 
political arrangement is its contribution to good lives” (Kekes, 1998: 16).  Under traditional 
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conservatism, there are primary values which derive from human nature that all good people 
agree upon.  Additionally, “good” lives are lived by acquiring “secondary values” which 
vary based on time and location and are found by adhering to traditions while remaining 
skeptical of the emergent systems of thought that counter them (Kekes, 1998: 65-66).  This 
conventional mindset is particularly evident in issues pertaining to immigration and child 
care where emphases on traditionalism shape governmental efforts (see Lippert and 
Pyykkonen, 2012).  As there are believed to be universal notions of “good” and “evil”, 
conservative mentalities stress facilitating the moral while avoiding the immoral.  
Neoconservative political mentalities are chiefly differentiated from traditional conservatism 
in their championing of the state as the primary initiator of conservative morality (Brown, 
2006: 697).  The supposed necessity of moralized state power diametrically opposes 
neoliberal governmentality.  
 In the contemporary era, attempts at governing impaired driving behaviour employ 
hybridized/mixed knowledge formats that draw upon both neoliberal and neoconservative 
political mentalities.  While specific liberal discourses of rational choice and actuarial logic 
are still employed within mixed knowledge formats, also present are moral discourses 
emblematic of neoconservative political mentalities which order populations in manners 
distinct from those of risk management. As far as the issue of impaired driving is concerned, 
neoconservative moral discourses are espoused most prominently by the largest impaired 
driving victims’ rights group, MADD.  Public awareness brochures published by MADD 
Canada put forth their conception of the issue of impaired driving as a war between the 
malevolent actions of the impaired driver and the innocent victims and their families.  For 
MADD Canada, a complex social problem is reducible to the individual actions and moral 
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fortitude of the impaired driver.  For instance, MADD Canada’s (2012) brochure “Impaired 
Driving: It Will Cost You Big Time” stresses that impaired drivers “cause thousands of 
traffic crashes every year” and furthermore that “drinking drivers are responsible for 
approximately one-quarter of all people killed on Ontario roads”.  The immoral actions of 
these drinking drivers are believed to directly result in the loss of innocent lives and 
therefore necessitate governmental intervention.   
Mixed knowledge formats rely on pairing scientific discourse with heavily moralized 
cultural tropes.  As a result, much of the dominant discourse regarding impaired driving 
stresses the importance of a low blood alcohol concentration to reduce the threat of drinking 
and driving.  In an effort to frame the dangerousness of impaired driving, the scientific 
determination of impairment is used to remove doubt about individual idiosyncrasy.  Simply, 
“[blood alcohol concentration] refers to how much alcohol is in someone’s blood… a driver 
is not over the legal limit until he or she has reached a [blood alcohol concentration] of more 
than 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood” (Transport Canada, 2009: 12).  
Furthermore, as “blood flows through the body, it releases alcohol into the lungs in 
proportion to its concentration in the blood” while alcohol also “moves to your liver, which 
breaks down 90 per cent of it into carbon dioxide and water.  The rest passes, unchanged, out 
of your body” (Transport Canada, 2009: 12-13).  This biological description of alcohol and 
its effects on the human body authors a sense of legitimacy void of ambiguity.  What could 
be termed the cultural trope of blood alcohol concentration is used to shape the problem of 
impaired driving by appealing to the legitimacy of scientific rigour.  A high blood alcohol 
concentration is therefore believed to be “risky” regardless of the individual mitigating 
factors that may complicate this interpretation.   
31 
 
The use of hybridized or mixed knowledge formats in the shaping of populations is 
important because it calls attention to how scientific determinations of risk end up doing “old 
moral regulation work” (Moore and Valverde, 2000: 515).  Scientific discourse is often used 
to structure the implementation of many of the same cultural tropes that have historically 
justified intervention into events and behaviours involving alcohol.  For example, nearly 
ubiquitous throughout MADD Canada’s annual reports are the “facts” that “everyday 4 
Canadians are killed and 187 more Canadians are injured in alcohol and drug related 
crashes” (MADD Canada, 2007: 6).  What is left undefined is the degree to which the 
involvement of alcohol caused the adverse events which are the impetus for governmental 
efforts.  This lack of definition continues the long historical trend of assuming that when 
alcohol is involved in situations with adverse effects, it is believed to cause.  Indeed, that 
“the consumption of alcoholic beverages necessarily involves major risks to the public 
order” (Valverde, 2003: 237) is a belief so thoroughly naturalized as to appear beyond 
reproach.  In fact, it often appears alcohol and disorder are inexorably linked (Valverde, 
2003).  This supposed link between alcohol and menace justifies the neoconservative 
disciplinary logic of the victims’ rights movement and undergirds their famous slogan, ‘If 
you drink, don’t drive’.  Due to the hazards believed to be caused by the involvement of 
alcohol, good/moral drivers are those who do not drink before driving and contribute to a 
more benevolent future.  Conversely, immoral or sinful drivers are those who have made the 
conscious decision to drink before driving and therefore threaten to directly cause an 
accident in which innocent people may be killed or injured.   
It is at this juncture where the cultural trope of the killer drunk emerges.  The 
evocative imagery invoked by a social actor who decides to “drive drunk” and causes the 
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death of an innocent person justifies the necessity of controlling impaired driving without 
having to demonstrate the actual empirical risk posed by those drivers (Gusfield, 1981).   
The necessity of preventing the deaths and injuries believed to be related to drinking and 
driving calls upon the immoral cultural trope of the killer drunk.  The victims’ rights 
discourse repeatedly states that “[w]e can and must stop the deaths and injuries caused by 
this violent crime” (MADD Canada, 2003: 1).  The violence of the impaired driver and their 
harm to the victims of this behaviour become the primary focal point for the fight against 
impaired driving.  While certainly compelling, much of the rhetoric of victims’ rights groups 
evokes old fashioned imagery typically ascribed to utopian moralists (see Gusfield, 1986) 
and simply packages “old fashioned danger talk” (Moore and Valverde, 2000: 514) in a thin 
language of risk.   
As Moore and Valverde (2000) state, complex assemblages of risk become simplified 
in mixed knowledge formats as neoconservative moral discourses structure the interpretation 
of social problems.  Certain behaviours are more easily linked with negative outcomes due to 
their association with moralized substances such as alcohol.  For instance, the “deaths and 
injuries that occur each year as a result of impaired driving” (MADD Canada, 2010: 7) are 
not believed attributable to the system of automobile centred transportation which puts high 
speed vehicles on the same roads as unprotected pedestrians. Instead, these calamities are 
used by the malevolent effects of alcohol.  The victims’ rights discourse does not attribute 
deaths from impaired driving to automobile transportation as a whole because these groups 
do not believe driving to be a dangerous activity in and of itself.  Regardless, driving 
automobiles at high speeds remains an inherently dangerous activity that results in thousands 
of deaths each year as automotive infrastructure fundamentally shapes the layout of public 
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spaces for both drivers and pedestrians alike (Lochlann Jain, 2004).  Even in light of this 
startling fact, “the automobile’s intrinsic potential for violence and its disruptive effects on 
the safety of public places have been systemically underestimated or, worse still, inexcusably 
obscured” (Poama, 2012: 935).  To be clear, calling attention to the threats posed by 
automobiles in traffic accidents is not an attempt to suggest these are the “true” threats to 
public safety.  This assertion simply replaces the impaired driver as villain with the 
automobile in the drama of drinking and driving.  Rather, this is meant to show that 
neoconservative moral discourses work alongside scientific discourses of neoliberalism and 
shape the perception of certain (and push other) conceptions to the periphery.  
While the focus on the individual impaired driver is understandable given the 
economic logic of neoliberal governmentality, the notion of the chronotope helps to explain 
how non-scientific discourses also shape the threat of impaired driving.  Originally coined by 
Bahktin (1981), a chronotope denotes a hybrid entity that assumes the existence of a unique 
space/time unit which is used to unify a group of potentially heterogeneous risk factors. 
Moore and Valverde (2000: 520) submit that attempts at governing night club activity relied 
on hybridized risk amalgams that employed moralistic melodrama and semi-scientific 
descriptions of specific illicit drugs simultaneously to shape the dangers of club activity for 
female patrons.  The chronotope is employed to render explicit how scientific and moral 
discourses are used in conjunction with one another in the formation of governable 
populations and spaces.  Rather than attributing the new governmental efforts designed to 
control impaired driving behaviour as the product of a successful moral panic, chronotopes 
facilitate more informed governmentality analyses while not diminishing the plight of those 
killed in impaired driving incidents (see Garland, 2008; Moore and Valverde, 2000).     
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Fundamental to the notion of the chronotope is both the construction of a space/time 
unit that employs moralistic melodrama as well as the use of semi-scientific knowledge 
discourses.  First, central to MADD Canada’s public awareness efforts are the use of 
melodramatic stories in which the risk to the normative order of society is threatened by the 
violent actions of impaired drivers. MADD Canada’s annual reports from 2005 and 2007 
present two such instances of melodrama which create a space/time amalgam that shapes the 
risk of impaired driving.   
It’s Saturday September 9, 1995… Just after 1:00 am … Andrew Westlake and a crowd 
of about a hundred fellow students gathered outside a rural bar near St. Catharine’s, 
where a Brock University’s annual freshman party had just wrapped up.  They were 
talking, laughing, waiting for rides and stepping into taxis lined up across the quiet two 
lane road.  Some of the students heard an engine revving through the darkness, but no 
one was prepared for the Dodge Neon that so suddenly sped around the corner and then 
began to strike one student after another, after another, after another… (MADD, 2005: 
2). 
 
My husband Alfred was always a night hawk. Our day was his night. That’s why on 
November 3, 2002, it wasn’t unusual for him to be heading out to a coffee shop in the 
middle of the night.  Tragically, he never made it. An impaired driver who had just hit a 
taxi and was speeding up to escape the scene ended up t-boning my husband’s car in the 
middle of an intersection (MADD, 2007: 2). 
 
These two stories employ a mixed knowledge format in which a unique composition of space 
and time creates a subject that necessitates swift state intervention.  The fact that the stories 
occur late at night (when visibility is markedly reduced for all drivers) and affect innocent 
(sober) persons is a key reason for their inclusion.  The banal nature of these actions, waiting for 
a taxi, socializing with friends, driving at night, and getting a coffee further amplifies the threat 
posed by the impaired driver.  The focus on the impaired driver obscures the manner by which 
everyday social events such as driving at night are already imprinted by asymmetrical power 
relations.  The production of large heavy cars which operate at all times of day on the same 
roadways as unprotected pedestrians represents one manner by which powerful social groups can 
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adversely affect the safety of all social interactions.  However, the impaired driving chronotope 
unifies this assemblage of diverse issues and shapes the locus of governance around the crime of 
impaired driving.  The havoc wrought by a dangerously impaired driver could easily occur at 
noon on any day of the week; however, especially in the first instance, the incident is stated as 
having occurred on a weekend late at night.  These narratives are excellent examples of 
melodramatic story telling designed to compel emotional responses which call upon traditional 
moral discourses pertaining to alcohol and individual responsibility and govern populations in 
manners distinct from risk.  This distinction is particularly stark in the second instance where the 
impaired driver caused a collision (presumably because of their impairment) and fled the scene 
only to mortally injure another driver a short distance away.  The fact that these stories occur at 
night and on public roadways creates a space/time unit in which the problem of impaired driving 
is given shape.  The dangers of roadways at night, of the widespread adoption of auto centered 
transportation, and the dangers of the over use of alcohol are fused together to create a 
governable subject that gains ascendancy through its pairing with scientific discourse of blood 
alcohol concentration and neoliberal technologies of risk.  The simultaneous employment of 
moralizing melodrama alongside scientific discourse creates a powerful governable subject in the 
form of the impaired driver that relies on the individualized logic of neoliberal governmentality 
as well as moral discourses emblematic of neoconservative mentalities. Clearly, risk 
management techniques emblematic of neoliberal governmentality cannot be said to be the sole 
governmental technology used in the governance of impaired driving behaviours.  Also present 
are moral discourses indicative of neoconservative mentalities which structure the problem of 
impaired driving using moral discourses and emotionally compelling melodrama. 
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Precautionary Logic 
Among the many facets of the impaired driving movement, governmental 
technologies such as risk assessment vary as methods for organizing reality in manners 
conducive to controlling impaired driving behaviours (Ericson and Leslie, 2005).  Whereas 
risk as a technology of governance under social liberal governmentality sees an increasing 
collectivization of risks as demonstrated by the Columbia Plan, neoliberal risk management 
stipulates individual entrepreneurial management.  However, as deaths and injuries believed 
to be caused by alcohol impaired driving continue, precautionary logic develops with a 
specific focus on the governance of disasters.  Precautionary logic confronts risk at its limits.  
Whereas “risk management is a family of ways of thinking and acting involving calculations 
about probable futures” (Rose, 2001: 7), precautionary logic moves beyond this and 
stipulates that the pursuit of security must encompass all possibilities. This is in spite of the 
fact that doing so is both an actual and epistemological impossibility (see Boyle and 
Haggerty, 2012).  Precautionary logic therefore necessitates embracing the omnipresent 
threat of calamity in spite of the improbability of these events.  In light of the constant 
possibility of catastrophe, precautionary logic embraces “zero-risk”, or risk against risk 
whereby threats are categorized on the inability to assign values to them (Dean, 2010b: 472). 
However, precautionary logic does not apply to all potential risks that may face 
specific populations.  Rather as Ewald (2000) states, the precautionary principle targets risks 
marked by two key features.  First, those which feature a context of scientific uncertainty on 
one hand, and second a possibility of serious and irreparable harm on the other. This leads to 
measures being enacted that may or may not relate to any actual harm.  It is enough to 
assume that harm could have resulted to justify punishment.  This logic has been 
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documented by governmentality scholars extensively in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001.  As McCulloch and Pickering (2009: 636) note, much behaviour 
prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation in the United States is “entirely unconnected to 
actual violence”. The word terrorism has become a cultural trope permeated with the 
imagery of mass calamity and apocalyptic violence.  Where there is ambiguity over specific 
behaviour and the potential for irreparable harm, the fact that there is uncertainty regarding 
measures employed is not used as an excuse for failure to act (Ericson, 2007).  Where 
uncertainty had previously been used as a criterion for innocence, current neoliberal 
governmentalities punish not solely on the basis of what harm actually occurred, but on what 
could have been expected to occur.  This is seen in in initiatives designed to control 
terrorism (see McCulloch and Pickering, 2009, Ericson, 2007), ‘anti-social behaviour’ (see 
Crawford, 2009) and also in the impaired driving movement. 
Increasingly, efforts to move beyond risk management in the face of irreparable harm 
are present in the governance of impaired driving behaviours.  Legislative efforts are 
progressively being directed at abating “the painful loss of a loved one whose life was taken 
due to a collision” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008: 4031).  In keeping with the 
precautionary logic of Ericson’s (2007) analytic, governmental action is increasingly 
conceived in response to genuine tragedies (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008e).  
Collisions believed to stem from alcohol impaired driving are not viewed as accidents but 
instead as “violent criminal acts that destroy innocent lives” (MADD Canada, 2006: 4).  
Therefore every person killed in an alcohol-related collision serves as an occasion for 
legislators to turn their loss “into an opportunity to prevent further tragedies on our roads so 
that others will not have to go through their tragic experience (Legislative Assembly of 
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Ontario, 2008: 4031).   The focus on calamities related to impaired driving is noteworthy due 
to the fact that the province of Ontario’s “roads are among the safest in North America and 
have been every year for more than a decade” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008: 
4030).   
As a form of behaviour engaged in by actors in a society characterized by a dependence 
on auto centric transportation, impaired driving is a significant source of uncertainty in 
liberal social imaginaries.  This is partially due to the long history of regulation of alcohol 
problems (see Levine, 1984; Valverde, 1998) but also to how the offence of impaired driving 
is criminalized.  The Criminal Code of Canada states:   
253. Every one commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or vessel or operates 
or assists in the operation of an aircraft or of railway equipment or has the care or control 
of a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment, whether it is in motion or not,  
(a) while the person's ability to operate the vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment 
is impaired by alcohol or a drug; or 
(b) having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration in the person's 
blood exceeds eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood. 
Firstly, article 253(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada allows for subjective determinants of 
impairment to become legal standards.  In instances where impairment is not determined 
from blood alcohol concentrations, law enforcement officials determine a suspect’s level of 
intoxication from a series of field sobriety tests believed to indicate impairment.  These can 
include a horizontal nystagmus test
5
 or having the suspect walk a straight line and/or touch 
their hands to their nose with their eyes closed.  These tests are qualitative and require no 
special expertise on the part of the person conducting them.  Intoxication is not believed to 
be a condition whereby “special knowledge or training” (Levi and Valverde, 2001: 838) is 
needed to determine if the condition is present.  Impairment and the degree to which a 
                                                          
5
 This test involves having the subject visually track the movement of an object (i.e. a pen) and 
observe spontaneous eye movement as their eyes move horizontally.   
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person’s faculties are compromised are instead believed to lie in the realm of common sense.  
Heuristic determinants such as being too “drunk” to walk a line become legal standards of 
impairment and justify governmental action.  Scientific uncertainty pervades where 
impairment is able to be determined by lay individuals using qualitative tests.   
 While these qualitative standards possess legal authority in section 253(a) of the 
criminal code, the criminal charge of impaired driving is usually meted out differently.  The 
most widely recognized evidence leading to individuals being charged with impaired driving 
is breathalyzer tests that are believed to determine the suspect’s blood alcohol concentration.  
In determining the amount of alcohol in drivers’ bodies, police officers typically ask that 
suspects provide a breath sample at roadside that registers a simple ‘pass or fail’ reading.  
This serves as the reasonable and probable grounds for police officers to request suspects 
provide another breath sample into an approved screening device.  The approved device 
gives a chronometric reading of blood alcohol concentration. Section 253 (b) of the Criminal 
Code of Canada criminalizes the act of “having care or control” of a motor vehicle with a 
blood alcohol concentration of 80 milligrams or higher in 100 millilitres of blood.  As 
determinants of impairment, blood alcohol tests have legal authority because blood alcohol 
is believed to be “fully isometric with behaviour” (Gusfield, 1981: 65).  However, 
experience with alcohol, age and sex all influence how alcohol affects the faculties of 
drivers.  It cannot be said resolutely that all drivers who register a blood alcohol 
concentration of .08g/dL or higher are impaired.  The chronometric tests of impairment are 
instead what literary scholars term a ‘synecdoche’, where a part of a body is taken as the 
whole.  Blood alcohol studies are most useful at determining impairment when taken in 
conjunction with other relevant factors such as time of day, conditions of roads and 
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automobiles, age, experience, and sex (Boorah, 2011).  This is because breathalyzers suffer 
from a logical fallacy whereby the outcome of a test, positive or negative, is used to 
determine whether a condition exists. This confuses the probability that a person would test 
positive if they were driving under the influence with the probability that a person was 
driving under the influence if they tested positive.  As such there is a degree of uncertainty in 
chronometric tests for blood alcohol which becomes paired with a perceived likelihood for 
irreversible harm and fosters the implementation of precautionary logic.   
 Where the legal system fails to prevent irreversible and catastrophic failures, 
precautionary logic is fostered and we are to expect that which is unlikely.  The legal system 
acts as a form of risk management in its efforts to ensure the security of the population (see 
Levi and Valverde, 2001).  It is expected that new laws will convince drivers not to drive 
after drinking and prevent the deaths and injuries from impaired driving.  As it concerns the 
impaired driving movement, we have seen increasingly restrictive ideas proliferate in the 
governance of this behaviour.  For example, Frank Klees of the Progressive Conservative 
Party of Ontario stated that “there should be not one ounce of alcohol on anyone that gets in 
front of a wheel” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008b: 4446).  Clearly, where there is 
scientific uncertainty on one side and a threat of irreversible harm on the other, 
precautionary logic becomes instituted as a method of preventing catastrophic harms in an 
effort to provide security for liberal populations. 
Counter-Law One 
In neoliberal political cultures obsessed with uncertainty, counter-laws become the 
way reality is programmed in line with this governmentality.  New forms of legislation, 
though not necessarily new criminal laws become enacted at the expense of traditional 
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standards of justice. This is done in the name of providing security for a society increasingly 
invested in governing behaviour in an a priori fashion (see Zedner, 2007).  Legislation in 
Ontario has been especially oriented towards regulating the actions of young drivers with the 
recently passed Road Safety Act of 2009 serving as one prominent instance of this trend.  
The Road Safety Act creates a zero tolerance provision as it pertains to the blood alcohol 
concentration of drivers aged 21 and under.  While possessing a blood alcohol concentration 
remains decriminalized, the Road Safety Act allows for the governance of specific 
populations using the legal system in a manner analogous to criminal sanctions.  A record of 
the offence is maintained on the driver’s performance record to which insurance companies 
have access (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2009).  Therefore, while violations of this 
administrative offence do not carry criminal penalties, there remains the possibility for 
significant extrajudicial fines in the form of increased insurance premiums or greater 
restrictions in insurance policies.   
The history of young driver regulation is replete with governmental initiatives and 
therefore several points of interest must be acknowledged when considering the counter-law 
characteristics of the Road Safety Act.  First, prior to this legislation fully licensed drivers 
under the age of 22 were permitted to drive with blood alcohol concentrations beneath .05 
g/dL before they could expect to incur sanction
6
.  Second, the zero tolerance provision for 
young drivers is by no means novel to Ontario driving legislation.  Since 1994, under the 
graduated licensing programme new drivers have been held to zero tolerance standards until 
they achieve their full license.  Furthermore, individuals under the age of 19 are not legally 
                                                          
6
 In Ontario, police are able to remove any motorist from the road who they suspect is incapable 
of driving safely, regardless of their blood alcohol concentration.  However, drivers are typically 
not sanctioned for registering blood alcohol concentrations below .05 g/dL.   
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permitted to drink.  In light of these pre-existing restrictions, this thesis examines the Road 
Safety Act as it pertains to controlling the behaviour of fully licensed drivers aged 19 to 21 
inclusive.  
The Road Safety Act brings into effect new measures that function to increase the 
capacity of the judicial apparatus to govern impaired driving behaviours.  At its heart, the 
Road Safety Act comprises two initiatives pertaining to impaired driving.  The first grants 
police the power to impound vehicles of drivers who register a blood alcohol concentration 
exceeding the legal limit as well as those who refuse to submit to a breath test. The second 
element and the one which is the focus of this thesis is what has been colloquially termed the 
“Under-21 Prohibition”.  Whereas all new drivers in Ontario are prohibited from possessing 
a blood alcohol concentration while participating in the province’s graduated licensing 
programme, the zero tolerance provision of the Road Safety Act effectively extends this 
amount of time for young drivers from age 19 to 21 inclusive.  Prior to this, fully licensed 
drivers aged 19 or older could register a blood alcohol concentration below .05 g/dL before 
they would reasonably expect to incur sanctions.  It is noteworthy this zero tolerance 
extension does not apply to drivers who acquire licenses when they are older than 21. These 
drivers are subjected to the standard blood alcohol restrictions of the graduated licensing 
programme.   
As Ericson (2007) employs the concept, the first form of counter-law is demarcated 
from initiatives that are simply restrictive.  Counter-law one is enacted to pre-empt imagined 
sources of harm and are employed as “the strongest statement of the authoritative certainty 
by government” (Ericson, 2007: 24).  It is this focus on imagined harm that differentiates 
counter-law one from what may be more restrictive or punitive programmes (see Levi, 
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2009).  Crucial to this legislation embodying a form of counter-law one is its purpose in 
mitigating imagined and not necessarily empirical sources of harm (Ericson, 2007).  The 
Road Safety Act embodies this preoccupation with harm and an inherent necessity to pre-
empt these problems.  This emphasis on pre-emption fundamentally differs from the 
disciplinary mechanisms of government that flourished under social liberalism and which 
focussed on reactive investigation (Deukmedjian, 2013).  Key to the implementation of the 
Road Safety Act is the harm that results from automobiles as this excerpt from the Ontario 
Legislature details:   
Every day, two people are killed and ten more are seriously injured on Ontario’s roads.  
Many of these collisions are, in fact, preventable.  To combat some of the most 
persistent and dangerous driver behaviours, we need to make drivers understand the 
consequences.  Today I am introducing new legislation that will, if passed by the 
legislature, keep our young drivers safe and get drunk drivers off our roads (Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario, 2008: 4030). 
The harms that result from drivers, and in particular, “drunk” drivers are believed to be such 
a danger that new measures must be enacted to make roads safer and ensure these harms are 
prevented.  The question of whether or not these measures are necessary has to do with 
issues of safety and “keeping kids alive” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008: 4438).  In 
fact, the need to pre-empt imaginary sources of harm has the effect of polarizing the debate 
as those who act against proposed measures are deemed to be in support of the adverse 
conditions that seemingly proliferate.  
Another of counter-law’s key traits is its focus on revoking legal safeguards and due 
process standards that may prevent ideal certainty of detection, apprehension, and punishment.  
Whereas prior to the establishment of the Road Safety Act young drivers between 19 and 21 
were held to the same standards of justice as their older counterparts.  These traditional standards 
of justice have been revoked to ensure that drivers believed to pose an increased threat of harm 
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are expedited by the judicial apparatus.  Rather than ensuring the behaviour of these individuals 
is actually harmful, it is enough to suspect their behaviour could pose harm to justify sanctions 
against these individuals.  It is no longer necessary to prove that young drivers have committed 
an affirmative action, or a failure to act.  Nor is it necessary to prove intention to commit an 
offence.  The traditional standards of prosecution in the form of actus reus and mens rea are 
suspended as only the counter-law “principle of finus reus: when criminalization is necessary for 
national security” (Ericson, 2007: 48), is necessary to justify governmental action in the 
prevention of imagined sources of harm.  The necessity of preventing imagined sources of harm 
moves beyond actuarial assessments of harm to prevent imagined tragedies as this anecdote from 
the Ontario Legislature illustrates:  
I remember a good friend of mine who was a baseball coach and recounted going to an 
accident with young people in the car and one of the kids who was killed was a kid he 
had coached.  So it had a very profound effect as he was extracting that young man from 
a vehicle, and the person was unfortunately killed on that occasion.  Police officers will 
tell you this and ambulance attendants will tell you this but here’s what OPP commander 
Bill Grodzinski had to say: “This legislation is extremely positive and it should go a long 
way to reducing the toll of tragedies we see on our highways and our roadways on a 
daily basis (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008b: 4439). 
 
To prevent these harms and others like them there is a perceived necessity to enact strict new 
regulations that ignore the traditional principles of justice as well as previous standards of due 
process.  New drivers are not being held to the same due process standards as their older 
counterparts or those standards to which they were previously held.  Nor are new drivers being 
held to traditional standards of justice that necessitate the commission of an illegal act.  Rather, 
drivers under the age of 22 are being held to the counter-law principle of finus reus whereby the 
perceived risk of their action is deemed such a threat to the security of the population that 
governmental intervention is assumed to be obligatory.   
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In keeping with the preventative logic of counter-law, populations are conceptualized 
based on their imagined threat to social interaction. These groupings function as a governmental 
technology for shaping a segment of the population as targets for governmental programmes 
such as the Road Safety Act.  In addition to revoking standards of due process for groups 
imagined to pose a significant risk of harm, there is also an increasing tendency to treat these 
imagined sources of harm as offences.  This is an increasingly common practice in political 
cultures characterized by neoliberal governmental tendencies (see Ashworth and Zedner, 2008).  
One area where this trend is particularly evident is in counter-terrorism legislation passed in the 
wake of September 11
th
, 2001.  As McCulloch and Pickering (2009: 631) state, there is an 
increasing tendency towards criminalization of conduct labelled “terrorist-related” even if there 
is no evidence to suggest harms have occurred or were intended.  In a related vein, the Road 
Safety Act’s concern with the behaviours of impaired drivers and the necessity of removing this 
aberrational individual from highways fuels the collective drive for more restrictive initiatives.   
The tendency to treat imagined sources of harm as offences is how Ericson’s (2007) 
conceptualization of counter-law differs from Foucault’s (1995).  The task of governing is 
increasingly taken up with efforts to reduce imagined sources of harm through expansion of the 
judicial apparatus.  As Garland (1996: 446) states: “[r]ates of property crime and violent crime… 
have become an acknowledged and commonplace feature of social experience” that have begun 
to “erode one of the foundational myths of modern societies: namely, the myth that the sovereign 
state is capable of providing security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial 
boundaries” (1996: 448).  While in much of society legal infractions are governed at a distance 
(see O’Malley, 2010), contemporary impaired driving governmental efforts are specifically 
aimed at reasserting the state’s capacity to govern modern society that is deemed to be 
46 
 
threatened.  Beginning in the 1980’s “governments began to pass strict new laws and police 
forces tried hard to reduce drinking and driving” (Transport Canada, 2009: 7).  As imagined 
sources of harm are believed to threaten the capacity of the state to provide security, counter-
laws are enacted to prevent this from occurring.  For impaired driving, this means certain 
segments of the population are believed to be in need of more authoritative governance (see 
Dean, 2002) due to their inability to practice their own ‘ethical despotism’ (Valverde, 1996) 
upon themselves. As Moore’s (2000) study of university student life has found, imagined sources 
of harm are treated by university personnel as offences in need of interventionist programming 
most often when they are linked to the use, or over use of alcohol.  Where there is a connection 
to a highly moralized substance such as alcohol which is believed to threaten the governability of 
specific populations, authoritative action is taken to manage these imagined sources of harm as 
offences.     
The tendency to treat imagined sources of harm as offences is particularly noticeable in 
the disturbing tendency to treat uncertainty in a manner analogous to crime.  Individuals are 
increasingly being penalized based not simply on what they could have known or should have 
reasonably known (see Levi and Valverde, 2001) but instead based on what they should have 
expected.  Uncertainty is increasingly being treated as an offense and exceptions are 
progressively being muddled. This is particularly evident in this selection from the December 4
th
 
meeting of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario where the necessity of the zero tolerance 
provision is debated:  
As has been pointed out, .0 could be problematic from the perspective that if you’re 
taking cough medicine- some of the liquid ones you can take- you’re going to be 
blowing over .0 and you’re not even taking alcohol, so you could technically be charged 
for driving under the influence because you have a cold and you’re taking medication 
(Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008c: 4454). 
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Due to the highly moralized involvement of substances such as alcohol, uncertainty as to how 
regulations should apply, which may have served as a vindicating factor previously, are being 
increasingly ignored in the pursuit of certainty.  The act of driving with very low blood alcohol 
concentrations had previously not been a focus of legislators.  However, we are currently seeing 
this behaviour being lumped in with the dangerously impaired as the efforts to govern drinking 
and driving increasingly disregard uncertainty as a vindicating factor.  The necessity of the zero 
tolerance provision of the Road Safety Act is deemed necessary because “drinking drivers aged 
19, 20, and 21 have the highest rates of involvement in both fatal collisions and collisions 
overall” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2008b: 4442).  What are seldom considered within 
the legislature are the ulterior ways blood alcohol concentrations can manifest themselves.  Not 
all who register blood alcohol concentration levels fit the traditional archetype of the drinking 
driver.  However, as past studies by Moore (2000) and Levi and Valverde (2001) have shown, 
when alcohol is correlated with harm the link is often taken to be causal. In cases where alcohol 
is involved in social problems authorities may be expected to assume “based on their common 
sense knowledge that alcohol is a causal factor in the impugned incident” (Moore, 2000: 418).  
Because their behaviour matches others believed to be harmful the fact that there is uncertainty 
over the efficacy of measures proposed does not prohibit use of measures as a way to ensure 
certainty and prevention of harm (Ericson, 2007).   
Through its attempts to pre-empt imagined sources of harm and by removing traditional 
legal safeguards and standards of due process the Road Safety Act 2009 fits Ericson’s (2007) 
notion of counter-law one.  Where there are believed to be increased threats to the security of the 
population, traditional standards of law are revoked and imagined sources of harm are treated as 
offences in preventative efforts.  As Gusfield (1981: 65) states, where legal limits had previously 
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been set high to account “for many people and many situations” and the continued uncertainty of 
alcohol’s effects on individual drivers, they are now being set low in an effort to pre-empt 
imagined sources of harm.  The fact that there is uncertainty over the risk these drivers pose is 
not a significant obstacle to the implementation of these measures designed to pre-empt the 
imagined sources of harm at the expense of traditional standards of justice.       
Counter-Law Two 
The study of social problems via the governmentality analytic is primarily concerned 
with “regimes of truth” that define legitimate governmental efforts throughout history (Cotoi, 
2011: 111).  As Ericson (2007) assumes that the neoliberal goals of downloading responsibility 
and encouragement of entrepreneurship have become the new logic of legitimate governmental 
action, it follows that this centrifugal logic would promote securitization and not discipline as 
under centripetal social liberalism.  In an examination of impaired driving surveillance 
programmes, this thesis differentiates between securitizing and disciplinary surveillance.  
Contemporary programmes adhering to both securitizing and disciplinary logics continue under 
neoliberal governmentality.  As such, any attempts to move beyond discipline and into a “post-
disciplinary order” (see Castel, 1991: 293) may run the risk of muddling important distinctions 
between these two logics.  As it pertains to controlling impaired driving in Ontario, sobriety 
checkpoints and report impaired driver initiatives seem to have become the primary methods for 
detecting and apprehending impaired drivers.  Each of these is elaborated in turn to determine 
how and to what extent they fit Ericson’s (2007) notion of counter-law two.  
Sobriety Checkpoints and Surveillance 
While not a particularly novel approach to controlling impaired driving in Ontario, 
sobriety checkpoints have grown in prominence since 2008 when the Liberal government 
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committed to doubling the provincial budget for such programmes (Government of Ontario, 
2012).  Originally begun in 1977 as Reduce Impaired Driving in Etobicoke (though later 
changed from Etobicoke to Everywhere (RIDE)), RIDE programs serve as Ontario’s main 
provincially funded sobriety checkpoint.  As detailed by the Traffic Injury Research Foundation 
(TIRF: 2011: 1), RIDE programs involve police officers stopping all passing vehicles or a 
predetermined systematic selection of automobiles (i.e. every fifth is stopped, etc.) for inspection 
at roadblocks whose location is typically determined by a high prevalence of ‘alcohol related 
accidents’ (The Globe and Mail, 1979, May 8: TIRF, 2011).  Officers approach the driver and 
identify themselves while simultaneously explaining the purpose of the stop and determining 
whether or not the driver had consumed alcohol and/or shows signs of intoxication (TIRF, 2011).  
Drivers that show signs of impairment are detained in a safe area where they are asked additional 
questions and where they may be required to take a preliminary breath and/or field sobriety test.  
Those who fail a preliminary breath test are then required to perform another test on an approved 
screening device that gives a chronometric reading of blood alcohol concentration.  These data 
are used as the primary source of evidence for charging instances of impaired driving behaviour. 
As reported in the Globe and Mail, sobriety checkpoints are believed to be a necessary form of 
surveillance because “when motorists are convinced that the chances of getting caught are high, 
there will be a dramatic reduction in impaired driving” (Katz, 1984: L8).  The increased chance 
of impaired driving being detected is believed to deter the driver from driving after drinking.   
To determine how and to what extent RIDE programmes are instances of counter-law 
two it is necessary to determine if these programmes, as they have been conceived to control 
impaired driving, are oriented towards governing in a centripetal or centrifugal manner. To 
accomplish this, it is useful in this instance to perceive sobriety checkpoints as analogous to 
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borders between nations.  As traditional markers of sovereignty there is little per se disciplinary 
in the surveillance apparatuses employed at borders (Walters, 2006).  Rather, there is a 
distinctive attempt to determine the level of threat posed by individuals as they attempt to cross 
from one sovereign region to another.  Borders primarily govern issues of access and have 
“always been in the business of distinguishing the wanted from the unwanted, the safe from the 
dangerous, the national from the foreigner” (Walters, 2006: 198).  As such, individuals are 
subjected to surveillance to determine if they are allowed to cross into another sovereign 
jurisdiction.   Those who exceed a predetermined threshold of tolerance are selected for 
additional screening and allowed to pass or rejected.  Borders distinguish between the wanted 
and the unwanted, the benevolent and the malevolent, and therefore operate according to the 
securitizing logic of war and defense (Deukmedjian, 2013) where “fixed standards and norms are 
made to float” (Walters, 2006: 191).  There is no distinguishable attempt at reform and retraining 
but rather a determination of acceptance or rejection based on allowable thresholds of tolerance.   
In a manner analogous to borders, sobriety checkpoints abandon attempts at disciplinary 
reform.  Drivers exceeding the allowable threshold of tolerance for intoxication are removed 
from the road and penalized.  There is a distinctive orientation towards the removal of threats to 
public safety that manifest themselves as impaired drivers.  It is important to realize that all 
impaired driving is not targeted by sobriety checkpoints.  RIDE programmes often catch and 
release drivers who have been drinking as evidenced by the following anecdote in the December 
20
th
, 1993 issue of the Globe and Mail:  
About two hours into his shift, Constable Parsons approaches a brown Hyundai sedan.  
The 62 year old driver rolls down his window and Constable Parsons asks him, ‘Have 
you had anything to drink this evening?’  
‘No’ says the driver.  But the policeman is skeptical. He can smell traces of alcohol on 
the driver’s breath.  He moves his head a little closer to the driver to confirm his 
suspicion.  He repeats the question: ‘Have you had anything to drink tonight?’ 
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‘No’, repeats the driver. 
‘Well you had something to drink tonight, Sir. I can smell it on your breath.’ 
A few seconds later the driver admits: ‘I had a beer.’ 
Constable Parsons orders the driver to pull his car over to the side where he administers 
a breathalyzer test.  The driver passes so he’s free to go (Viera, 1993: A10).  
 
As this example illustrates, sobriety checkpoints concern themselves primarily with drivers who 
exceed an allowable threshold of tolerance. Minor deviations characterized by slight drinking 
and driving are allowed while threshold violations become the primary locus of governmental 
control in accordance with a centrifugal logic of war and defense.  Drivers are sanctioned for 
their violations of thresholds and not their adherence to a specified norm.  As Levi and Valverde 
(2001: 826-827) remark, “a common knowledge has been deployed to responsibilize drinkers in 
drunk-driving cases despite whatever knowledge they may have of their own capacity or ability 
to drive”.  Drivers who are believed to exceed an allowable threshold of conduct are targeted for 
governmental control whether or not their current state actually prevents them from driving in a 
normal manner.  Police may stop and eventually charge drivers with the criminal offence of 
impaired driving even if “there was nothing improper about [their] driving or the condition of 
[their] car” (Dedman v. The Queen, 1985: 10).  The norm as the measure for policing impaired 
driving behaviour is abandoned in an effort to pre-empt imagined sources of harm.  Thresholds 
of tolerance are enacted beyond which drivers are believed to pose undue risk to the security of 
the population whether or not this matches the empirical reality.  As the case of Dedman v. The 
Queen (1985) illustrates, adhering to normative driving behaviour will not allow suspected 
impaired drivers to avoid sanction if they are found to violate acceptable thresholds of tolerance.  
The centrifugal governmental logic of RIDE abandons attempts at reform and retraining and 
therefore adheres more closely to the centrifugal securitizing logic characteristic of neoliberal 
governmentality.   
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Report Impaired Drivers and Surveillance 
 In addition to sobriety checkpoints, a new and innovative surveillance apparatus called 
report impaired drivers (RID) has been introduced in Ontario.  Taking advantage of the near 
ubiquitous presence of cell phones within the general population, RID initiatives encourage 
individuals to call 911 if they suspect someone is driving while impaired.  RID initiatives are 
mobilized by individual communities who set up their own ‘franchises’ as limbs of larger 
organizations.  These larger impaired driving organizations include groups such as MADD, 
Report All Impaired Drivers, and the Ontario Community Council on Impaired Driving 
(OCCID).  These groups provide guidance and recommendations for fledgling community 
programmes as they coordinate their efforts with volunteers and government personnel.  Several 
of these groups provide specific advice about how to effectively have impaired drivers removed 
from roadways.  For example, in their Operation Lookout: Best Practices Manual, OCCID 
(2008: 6) suggests citizens who believe someone is driving while impaired should contact police 
and state:  
(1) That they have seen an impaired driver.  
(2) The location.  
(3) Vehicle description (i.e. licence plate number, colour, make and model). 
(4) Description of travel.  
(5) Description of driver.  
 
The necessity of reporting suspected impaired drivers is believed so dire that citizens are 
encouraged call the police even if they themselves are driving and leaving the road would cause 
them to lose sight of the suspected impaired driver.  This is in spite of recent legislation 
prohibiting the use of handheld devices while driving (see Babbage, 2009).  Programmes such as 
Operation Lookout are designed to encourage ordinary people to look out for and report impaired 
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drivers.  As such they have a democratizing effect on the judicial apparatus.  No expertise is 
necessary and anyone can report another driver. 
As a governmental programme meant to control instances of impaired driving behaviour, 
RID initiatives govern drivers using apparatuses of security distinct from those of sobriety 
checkpoints.  Through a partnership between community members and police officials, the 
Operation Lookout RID programme employs a checklist of driver behaviours believed to be 
indicative of potentially harmful conduct.  Under the section for ‘How to Spot’ impaired drivers 
Operation Lookout’s (OCCID: 2008: 6) ‘Best Practices Manual’ lists ten behaviours that are 
indicative of someone driving while impaired.  These behaviours include: 
1) Driving unreasonably fast, slow or at inconsistent speeds.  
2) Slowly drifting in and out of lanes. 
3) Driving without headlights, failing to lower high beams, leaving turn signals 
on. 
4) Tailgating and changing lanes frequently at excessive speeds. 
5) Making wide turns, changing lanes or passing without sufficient clearance. 
6) Overshooting, stopping well before or disregarding signals and signs. 
7) Approaching signals or leaving intersections too quickly or very slowly. 
8) Driving with windows open in cold or inclement weather. 
9) Stopping without cause in a live traffic lane. 
10) Driving in low gear for no apparent reason or frequently grinding gears. 
 
Clear from even a cursory reading of this list is how minor deviations are meant to convey 
concern that a driver may be impaired but are not themselves the target of governmental power.  
What is most notable from points one, three, six, seven, eight, and ten is that these all include 
behaviours that are not themselves do not seem to be harmful themselves but rather are believed 
to be indicators to harmful behaviour.  This differentiates the governmental logic of RID 
initiatives from disciplinary mechanisms which concentrate on the smallest of infractions 
(Caluya, 2010).  In fact, “the smallest of infractions must be taken up with all the more care for it 
being small” (Foucault, 2007: 45).  This is done in the hope of preventing larger unwanted 
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behaviour and ensuring the continued governance of docile subjects.  However, RID 
programmes operate not according to a disciplinary logic of order maintenance and prevention, 
but rather to a securitizing logic of war and defense.  Disciplinary mechanisms categorize social 
behaviour into dichotomous categories of permitted and forbidden, good and evil (Caluya, 2010); 
however, apparatuses of security allow both to occur within predetermined thresholds to 
determine how they will function in relation to another.  RID programmes allow minor 
deviations in driving behaviour to occur and use these as the basis for intervention to determine 
if the suspected harmful behaviour is exceeding the predetermined threshold. For example, 
drivers who are “driving with the windows down in cold or inclement weather” (OCCID, 2007: 
6) may be made the subjects of governmental intervention but will not likely garner punishment 
unless they are proven to exceed the threshold of tolerance for drinking and driving.  Whereas 
disciplinary mechanisms of governance would correct small deviations in driving behaviour 
solely for their being deviations, apparatuses of security allow these minor behaviours to occur 
below thresholds of tolerance but use these as indicators of potential security risks.    
Although both RID initiatives and sobriety checkpoints operate according to security 
logics, RID programmes operate by submitting drivers to surveillance apparatuses unwittingly.  
Whereas police in Ontario filter drivers through highly visible sobriety checkpoints, RID 
initiatives monitor driver behaviours without their knowledge and thereby seek to govern their 
conduct in a unique manner.  By using potential indicators of harmful behaviour as the primary 
impetus for governmental intervention, RID initiatives function in a similar vein as the special 
investigations units (SIU) Ericson (2007: 106) analyzes and that are increasingly employed by 
many disability insurers.  To ensure that fraudulent claimants are not permitted to receive 
continued benefits and therefore risk the viability of the insurance system for all claimants, 
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disability insurers are increasingly investing in surveillance initiatives that monitor those who are 
receiving disability benefits.  The surveillance carried out by SIU’s depends in large part on 
physical monitoring of claimants by undercover operatives who try and capture suspects on 
camera doing things that negate their claims of injury.  For example, Ericson (2007: 106) 
documents one claimant who stated that their injury was exacerbated by medical testing although 
in the days prior they had been photographed participating in a “Rambo-esque archery 
tournament, in which [they] traveled in camouflage fatigues and crawled across all kinds of 
terrain”.  This evidence was then used to justify their exclusion from continued coverage.  Both 
disability insurers’ SIU operations and RID initiatives monitor the behaviour of persons of 
interest to determine if their actions justify their exclusion from either insurance coverage or 
driving, respectively.  Both seek to monitor and target behaviour that would indicate a security 
risk is occurring.  However, neither of these types of monitoring are particularly concerned with 
ensuring that the power of ‘the gaze’ is internalized within the object of surveillance.  In 
contradistinction to Orwell, “today’s Big Brother is not about keeping people in and making 
them stick to the line but about kicking people out and making sure that when they are kicked out 
that they will duly go and not come back” (Bauman, 2006: 25).  The increased focus on 
securitization over discipline creates an interesting problem within Ericson’s (2007) analytic and 
it is to this issue that I now turn.   
Impaired Driving Surveillance as Counter-Law Two  
While his approach to advancing surveillance studies in the 21
st
 century is novel in its 
attempt to marginalize the importance of the panoptic metaphor, Ericson’s (2007) analytic 
suffers due to a lack of distinction between disciplinary and securitizing surveillance practices.  
While we are not living within an ‘electronic’ (Gordon, 1987) or ‘super’ panopticon (Poster, 
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1990) as some have suggested, Ericson (2007) states that we are situated beneath a series of 
diverse, discrete institutions that contain the potential for interconnectedness and which break 
down the population into discrete units for monitoring and comparison (Haggerty and Ericson, 
2000).  This approach is more appropriate than those that suggest the existence of an ever 
expanding panopticon but it does not differentiate between disciplinary and securitizing 
mechanisms of government which causes it to muddle important distinctions in governmental 
programmes.  
The most prominent understanding of disciplinary governmental mechanisms used in 
sociological studies today was presented to the field via Foucault’s (1995) 1975 book, Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. In what may be the most widely disseminated part of any of 
his works, Foucault’s (1995) examination of panopticism analyzes the manner in which 
surveillance is applied to subjects via the hierarchical organization of centralized institutions. In 
developing the notion of the surveillant assemblage, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) sought to 
expand understandings of surveillance by focussing on the ways that surveillance institutions 
operate horizontally as part of a multiplicity.  While it was developed to displace the central 
dominance of Foucault’s panopticon in contemporary surveillance studies (see Haggerty, 2006), 
the surveillant assemblage instead mistakenly focusses on the ways in which many different 
panopticons can work together horizontally.  For instance, the idea of the surveillant assemblage 
assumes that various centres of calculation (i.e. police stations, military, and financial 
institutions) may work together to form a unique aggregation of data which can structure 
governmental efforts.  This approach fails to differentiate between the internal governmental 
logics of these centres of calculation.  The surveillant assemblage requires we assume that police 
forces and military headquarters operate according to the same disciplinary or securitizing logic 
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in their respective governmental approaches.  It seems that the surveillant assemblage moves to 
describe modern surveillance practices before a coherent understanding of surveillance is 
present. 
 While Ericson’s (2007) counter-law two differs from the panoptic metaphor it shares with 
it its disciplinary nature and centripetal governmental logic.  The goal of counter-law two is to 
introduce breaks and striations into otherwise free flowing phenomena in order to monitor the 
population in relation to normative patterns of behaviour (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) and 
ensure disciplinary self-governance (Ericson, 2007). Through the surveillant assemblage’s focus 
on counter-normative behaviour, individuals will become aware that they are being monitored 
and seek to discipline themselves in the future.  As conceptualized by Foucault (2007), this is 
indicative of centripetal governmental tendencies as discipline governs inward and monitors the 
smallest elements of social interaction to determine their relation to norms of social behaviour 
and target specific individuals in the interest of “order maintenance, order reproduction, and so 
on” (Deukmedjian, 2013: 55).  Actions that do not adhere to the acceptable behavioural norms 
are targeted for intervention and correction no matter the degree of deviation. This governmental 
logic starts from the “greatest common divisor… and programmatic action becomes directed at 
the lowest common structure” (Deukmedjian, 2013: 60).  Centripetal governance is perpetually 
bound up with the central doctrine of liberalism; that is, “that one always governs too much” 
(Dean, 2010: 144).  Therefore, there must be a balance between regulation and freedom on one 
hand and socialism and individualism on the other (Deukmedjian, 2013). This was essentially the 
problem Durkheim (1997) sought to illuminate in his famous work on suicide.  Durkheim (1997) 
found that suicide rates could be attributed to issues of governance.  Without proper attention to 
the balance between equilibrium (fatalist) vs. disequilibrium (anomic) and individualism (egoist) 
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vs. socialism (altruist), there would be a rise in social problems such as suicide. By maintaining 
equilibrium within the population, social problems such as suicide (though there are obviously 
countless others) can be minimized. 
Conversely, logics of security allow things to happen within preordained thresholds of 
tolerance regardless of their adherence to normative values (Foucault, 2007).   Instead of 
introducing breaks into flows of social interaction, securitization operates according to a logic of 
war and defense whereby deviations are permitted to occur while egregious infractions become 
targeted for intervention.  In contradistinction to its centripetal forms, centrifugal governance is 
expansive.  It begins with the lowest common divisor and expands outwards. As Foucault (2007: 
45) conceived them, centrifugal apparatuses of security operate by allowing things to happen; 
they have the tendency to expand and “allow the development of ever wider networks”. The 
centrifugal governmental tendencies of neoliberalism are tied to mechanisms of security which 
function according to thresholds of tolerance.  Whereas the social orientation of centripetal 
governmentality operates according to principles of order reproduction (Deukmedjian, 2013), 
apparatuses of security allow disequilibrium to occur in order to gauge that which is taking place.  
Instead of employing the binary of normative or counter-normative to determine the necessity of 
governmental intervention, apparatuses of security allow both these processes to occur and seek 
to establish ways that these processes can function in relation to each other (Foucault, 2007).  
The desire to maintain equilibrium in the governance of social issues is increasingly downplayed.  
This is because neoliberalism functions according to a separate governmental logic.  This raises 
an interesting dilemma as Ericson’s (2007) counter-law two is believed to discipline the 
population despite being the product of intense governmental securitization.  The lack of 
distinction between securitizing and disciplinary surveillance initiatives creates confusion in 
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analyses of governmental programmes.  According to Ericson’s (2007) analytic, neoliberal 
securitization is believed to foster disciplinary self-governance. However, as securitization is not 
meant to discipline populations, Ericson’ (2007) analytic confuses two distinct governmental 
mechanisms which ought to be analyzed separately as the case of impaired driving surveillance 
demonstrates.  
In light of this development there remains the task of determining how and to what extent 
sobriety checkpoints and RID programmes are emblematic of Ericson’s (2007) counter-law two.  
There are two key standards that must be met to decide that contemporary impaired driving 
surveillance programmes are instances of counter-law two.  First, in the face of imagined sources 
of harm, there must be an extension of surveillance apparatuses that foster the monitoring of 
populations beyond the legal, procedural, or traditional limits typically fixed on surveillance 
(Ericson, 2007).  Second, there must be an attempt by these surveillance apparatuses to break 
down flows of populations (Ericson and Haggerty: 2000) to monitor their behaviours and 
discipline populations in relation to a norm (Ericson, 2007).   
Using the first metric of this two-pronged approach it appears sobriety checkpoints act 
beyond the traditional limits placed on surveillance practices in their efforts to pre-empt 
imagined sources of harm consistent with a neoliberal governmentality.  The use of sobriety 
checkpoints by law enforcement officials in Ontario appears to violate section 8 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms that states that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. RIDE checkpoints enable police officers to stop and charge drivers “without 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing [they] had committed or [were] committing a 
criminal offense under any statute, either provincial or federal” (Dedman v. The Queen, 1985: 
30).   In the absence of observable deterioration of driving ability, there are no reasonable or 
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probable grounds to believe an offence has been committed.  Sobriety checkpoints therefore 
constitute a random and arbitrary stop that could be deemed unreasonable.   
Throughout their history, the use of sobriety checkpoints in North America has been met 
with significant challenges.  As of 2011, eleven American states prohibited the use of sobriety 
checkpoints because they are either illegal under state law (i.e. Idaho) or violate the state’s 
constitution (i.e. Michigan) (TIRF, 2011: 2).  Sobriety Checkpoints in Ontario have undergone 
similar legal challenges but have since obtained common law authority.  Initial attempts to 
expand RIDE checkpoints throughout Ontario saw constitutional challenges levied against the 
provincial government.  As detailed by Globe and Mail articles from 1980/81, RIDE 
programmes were initially ruled unlawful after constitutional challenges were brought forward 
from drivers charged under the programme.  In a May 23,
 1980 article entitled “RIDE ruled 
unlawful again, man who failed test cleared” it was stated that “police may stop drivers for spot 
checks only if there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence has been 
committed” (Yonson, 1980: A5).  Using the same principle, another man, Robert Dedman was 
acquitted (although later convicted upon appeal) of refusing to provide a breath sample as he was 
under no legal requirement to provide it as there was no reason to stop him in the spot check 
(Yonson, 1980).  After this ruling, police departments throughout Ontario were ordered to halt 
the operation of RIDE programmes while awaiting a Crown appeal of these cases.  At issue was 
“the timeless conflict between the right of the individual to peacefully go about his affairs free 
from needless and arbitrary interference on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the state 
to intervene and carry out all actions necessary to the protection of society as a whole” (Carriere 
and Laver, 1980: A2).   
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As a result of the increased attention given to impaired driving behaviour since the late 
1970’s the necessity of new measures to control this behaviour is deemed common sense in 
popular discourse.  In an article from the Globe and Mail which stresses the necessity of 
province wide sobriety checkpoints the perceived threat from impaired drivers is deemed so 
great a risk as to necessitate the imposition of intrusive police surveillance apparatuses.  The 
article titled, Some Never Get Home, states that “impaired driving is a dangerous game. Statistics 
prove it. Police forces publicize it. Yet thousands of intoxicated drivers still pretend they are 
capable of weaving their way safely home” (The Globe and Mail, 1979).  However, it is 
insufficient to simply acknowledge the risk posed by impaired driving; rather, “Ontario, with the 
cooperation of police forces across the province, should mount a determined fight to stop 
drunken drivers in their tracks; Or, better still, to deter drunks from driving” (The Globe and 
Mail, 1979).   The risk posed by impaired driving is believed to be so severe as to necessitate 
new programmes to control it.  And because of the seriousness of the problem of impaired 
driving, new programmes which seemingly constitute random and arbitrary stops of the manner 
prohibited by section 8 of the Charter, no longer meet the necessary criteria of ‘unreasonable’ 
(Ostberg, 2000).  Finally, what can be observed is a pattern of social behaviour in the form of 
impaired driving gaining increased attention and stigma that leads to the revocation of traditional 
standards of due process and legal safeguards.   
RID programmes also appear to violate traditional standards of law as they pertain to 
procedural limits placed on surveillance.  The imagined source of harm posed by impaired 
driving behaviour justifies intrusive surveillance of populations to reduce the fear of crime and 
increase risk of apprehension.  However, this is accomplished in the face of limits traditionally 
placed on the surveillance of populations.  In employing the general population as a group of 
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mobilized security cameras, RID programmes foster the development of an all-encompassing 
surveillance infrastructure which could not be matched by other police surveillance practices (i.e. 
sobriety checkpoints).  Sober drivers have a distinct advantage over surveillance arrangements 
such as cameras (Lippert and Wilkinson, 2010) as they can change their positions to better 
capture the information police require to most efficiently apprehend suspected impaired drivers.   
The second prong of Ericson’s (2007) counter-law two is not a constitutive feature of 
either sobriety checkpoints or RID initiatives. These programmes do not operate in relation to a 
norm in the same manner counter-law two is believed to (Ericson, 2007).  Instead, sobriety 
checkpoints and RID initiatives operate according to thresholds of tolerance.  Behaviours 
imagined to pose harm to other people are investigated and targeted for governmental 
intervention.  Conversely those behaviours which are not believed to pose harm, such as a fully 
licensed driver having a blood alcohol concentration within the threshold of tolerance
7
, are 
allowed to pass unpunished.  As counter-law two is believed to foster increased linkages between 
diverse institutions with the purposes of disciplining the populations under surveillance, neither 
RID initiatives nor sobriety checkpoints can be said to be emblematic of counter-law two. 
Conclusion 
Recently, there has been a wide array of new programmes instituted in North American 
governments designed to control acts of impaired driving.  The Government of Ontario has 
followed in this effort.  To render these programmes more comprehensible, this thesis adopted a 
genealogical approach committed to de-compartmentalizing the present.  This was done to 
expose the unique configurations of knowledge discourses which comprise contemporary 
governmental efforts.  By examining the rationalities and technologies of governance which 
                                                          
7
 This statement does not apply to drivers under the age of 22 after the passage of the Road 
Safety Act. 
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structure the implementation of governmental programmes, this thesis shows how current 
governmental efforts to control impaired driving are constituted by a unique assemblage of 
discourses specific to this historical era.  Various understandings of risk categorize segments of 
the population using idiosyncratic methods and inform both neoliberal and neoconservative 
mentalities of governance.  Furthermore, governmental programmes such as the Road Safety 
Act, sobriety checkpoints, and report impaired driver initiatives attempt to render reality in 
accordance with these rationalities and simultaneously marginalize alternative approaches 
towards governmental control. By approaching the study of governmental power in a manner 
that problematizes the unity of governmental programmes and by examining these programmes 
in relation to Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty, this thesis exposes the historical 
contingency of impaired driving governance in a manner consistent with a Foucaultian 
genealogical approach.  
To determine through what mentalities and technologies of governance impaired driving 
behaviour is currently being controlled as well as how and to what extent contemporary 
programmes reflect Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty, this thesis has explored each aspect 
of this analytic to determine how contemporary impaired driving governance reflects these 
notions.  First, governmental technologies in the form of both risk and moral discourses are used 
to organize populations.  However, as detailed analysis of governmental and victims’ rights 
literature has shown, when employed in coordination with neoliberal governmentality risk can be 
used as a technology meant to organize a collection of autonomous individuals, while 
simultaneously being employed as an actuarial technique meant to categorize a series of morally 
neutral actors.  However, technologies of governance may also shape governmental subjects in 
manners inconsistent with neoliberal governmentality.  In this sense, Ericson’s (2007) analytic is 
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perhaps too simplistic in its claim that the obsession with uncertainty which fuels contemporary 
risk management initiatives is rooted solely in neoliberal political mentalities. As MADD 
Canada’s annual reports show, neoconservative governmentalities also structure attempts at 
ordering the population and employ moral discourses to garner emotional responses and shape 
governmental efforts in manners inconsistent with neoliberal governmentality. Risk management 
can be said to compose several different approaches to governance and here functions as one of 
at least two governmental technologies that attempts to order the population in different although 
not necessarily inconsistent ways.  The inability of these technologies to eliminate the deaths 
related to impaired driving results in the establishment of precautionary logic which leads to 
criminalization through counter-law.   
Several contemporary governmental programmes fit Ericson’s (2007) conception of 
counter-law.  Among these, the Road Safety Act is a prominent example.  The zero tolerance 
provision of this legislation governs in an a priori manner to pre-empt actual harms committed 
consistent with securitizing neoliberal governmentality.  Traditional standards of law which aim 
to control harmful behaviour are suspended; instead, behaviours are now criminalized on the 
suspicion of their harm consistent with Ericson’s counter-law one principles.  The Road Safety 
Act removes legal safeguards and aims to govern impaired driving behaviour in a manner that 
treats uncertainty as analogous to crime. Therefore, the Road Safety Act is a form of counter-law 
as outlined by Ericson’s (2007) analytic.   
In addition to new legislations targeting impaired driving behaviour are new surveillance 
apparatuses designed to facilitate the detection of this conduct.  These programmes are informed 
by various governmental tendencies.  Both sobriety checkpoints and RID initiatives aim to 
monitor the flow of drivers on specific roadways and govern conduct in a centrifugal manner 
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characteristic of neoliberal governmentality.  However, as they do not govern according to a 
norm and discipline those under surveillance, they do not fit Ericson’s (2007) notion of counter-
law two.  As both of these programmes aim to monitor the population beyond the legal limits 
typically placed on surveillance practices, perhaps Ericson’s (2007) notion of counter-law two is 
too restrictive.   
In light of these findings, this thesis makes the following recommendations for further 
research using Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty as well as governmentality scholars 
exploring surveillance in contemporary liberal democracies.  First, thesis suggests revising 
Ericson’s (2007) analytic to include increased attention on the forces that structure the 
implementation of counter-law but do not adhere to neoliberal governmentality.  Ericson’s 
(2007) work is lacking in its attention to neoconservative rationalities of governance; therefore, 
those using Ericson’s (2007) analytic should consider not only neoliberal mentalities of rule but 
the neoconservative variants as well. This is most notable in cases where questions of how to 
govern involve moralized substances such as alcohol.  New scientific determinations of risk are 
often employed to enforce old moral standards while being packaged in contemporary risk 
language (Moore and Valverde, 2000).   
Second, scholars exploring contemporary programmes to determine if they reflect 
Ericson’s (2007) notion of counter-law two should differentiate between disciplinary and 
securitizing surveillance practices.  Ericson (2007) analytic assumes that neoliberal mentalities 
have fostered the development of increasingly intrusive surveillance apparatuses; however, we 
should not expect to see new programmes with the aim of disciplining those under surveillance.  
As Ericson (2007) failed to differentiate between securitizing and disciplinary programmes, 
centrifugally oriented initiatives such as sobriety checkpoints and RID initiatives fail to fit the 
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notion of counter-law two as they do not adhere to the disciplinary principles contained therein.  
To determine if new programmes represent instances of counter-law two, future research should 
abandon the claim that counter-law two is inherently disciplinary or securitizing and instead see 
new programmes in terms of how they exceed the legal limits traditionally placed on surveillance 
practices.   
This thesis has attempted to problematize contemporary governmental approaches to 
controlling impaired driving.  Many of the forums in which impaired driving control efforts are 
debated have become polarized due to the high degree of social stigma surrounding the act of 
driving after drinking. By exposing the present assemblage of historically contingent discourses 
that comprise our current understanding of impaired driving and its need of governmental 
control, it is hoped that further debates will acknowledge that the present drive to institute new, 
restrictive impaired driving programmes is at least partially the result of the present assemblage 
of motivating discourses, rather than the actual empirical harm caused by impaired driving.  It 
will be interesting to determine if future governmental efforts to control impaired driving 
behaviour will continue to be more restrictive than those that precede them in a manner 
consistent with Ericson’s (2007) analytic of uncertainty. 
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